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RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BY 
REPEAL OF THE MINING LAW OF 1872 
Shelby D. Green* 
"Property is nothing but a basis of expectation . . . . -31 
Jeremy Bentham 
The "sale" of public lands has continued for more than a cen- 
t ~ r y . ~  Any citizen holding a mining claim on a parcel of public land 
can purchase absolute title to the land3 for as little as $2.50 an acre.' 
This price has not been changed since 1872. The price and policy 
were originally determined at a time when this country, and in par- 
ticular the West, held pristine and seemingly boundless wilderness 
areas, such that encouraging the settlement of the West and the dis- 
covery and development of mineral resources seemed to be sound 
p o l i ~ y . ~  For most of the last 100 years, land titles obtained through 
Associate Professor, Pace University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law 
Center; B.S., Towson State University. 
1. JEREMY BENTHAM. THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-69 (Richard Hildreth ed. & Eti- 
enne Dumont trans., Oceana Publications 1975) (1864). 
2. In the last century, the United States has sold over 3.2 million acres of land under the 
patent provisions of the 1872 General Mining Law, an area the size of the State of Connecti- 
cut. 137 CONG. REC. S2015 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Between 
1980 and 1990, the Bureau of Land Management issued 657 patents, for a total of 4,752 
claims, covering approximately 179,915 acres. Id. (statement of Sen. Bumpers). The United 
States government still owns 725 billion acres of land, over 5 0 2  of which is located in Alaska, 
and more than 90% of the remaining lands located in 11 western states. PUBLIC LAND LAW 
REVIEW COMMISSION. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 22 (1970). 
3. General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. $6 21-54 (1988). "Except as otherwise pro- 
vided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States . . . shall be free 
and open to exploration and purchase . . . ." Id.  8 22. 
4. Id. 8 37. 
5. See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989). 
The author states that: 
[Tlhe main policy thrust into the early 20th Century was to transfer land from 
federal ownership to private individuals, developers and selected industries such as 
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this policy came without any burdens to the new owners as preserva- 
tion or reclamation efforts were not required, but also without much 
benefit to the previous owner, except for the satisfaction of further- 
ing a national p01icy.~ The new owners became vested with most of 
the traditional incidents of absolute ownership of property, including 
the right of possessing, excluding others, and enjoying the fruits and 
profits derived from the extraction and exploitation of valuable min- 
eral deposits.' There was no thought of preserving the then viewed 
limitless natural environmente or of increasing the then known lim- 
ited t r e a s ~ r y . ~  
railroads . . . . [The goals for the land transfers were] largely left to the new owners 
and developers, and the workings of the free marketplace . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Congress clearly believed the vast public domain would be more valuable to the 
growing nation if it were transferred to the hands of those who could develop it. 
There was no detailed plan for development prepared by economists, scientists, or 
anyone else . . . . The main guidelines appear to have been that the lands should be 
settled rapidly, a t  little or no cost to settlers, and that the new ownership should be 
predominantly private and widely distributed. 
Id. at 340 (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY. THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 33, 35, 38 (1985)). 
6. .%e infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
8. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987). 
9. In 1880, the first Public Land Commission reported to President Hayes that it cost 
the government four times more to transfer title to the land than was received from the miner 
as a patenting fee. See Michael McCloskey, The Mining Law of 1872, in THE MINING LAW 
OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1989). 
In 1974, the General Accounting Office ( "GAO)  reported that the government received 
about $12,000 for 41 mineral patents for land having a fair market value of more than S1 
million. See 137 CONG. REC. S2015 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
Government appraisers and local real estate brokers estimated the value of land sold between 
1980 and 1990 to be from $200 to $200,000 an acre. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. 
FEDERAL AND MANAGEMENT: THE MINING LAW OF 1872 NEEDS REVISION (1989). Of 20 
patented lands studied, the GAO found that the government received less than 54,500 for . 
lands valued between $14 million and $48 million. Id. A recent scandal as reported in the 
Congressional Record gives some additional reasons for concern: 
[The Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area] is located on the beautiful south- 
western coast of Oregon and is a popular tourist destination. In 1989, BLM [(the 
Bureau of Land Management)] announced its intention of issuing a patent for an 
uncommon variety of sand on claims covering over 700 acres in the heart of the 
National Recreation Area. Although the Material Disposal Act of 1947 and the 
Common Varieties Act of 1955 had effectively precluded the location and patent of 
claims for sand and gravel, the claimants relied on an exception in the law for un- 
common varieties. Six of the State's seven Congressmen wrote to the Secretary of 
the Interior requesting that the patent not be issued. The Secretary issued the pat- 
ent. After much public consternation regarding the possibility of a major sand quar- 
rying enterprise in one of Oregon's most popular scenic areas, the claimants let it be 
known that they would be open to trading their claims for suitable land else- 
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The "inexhaustible" quantity of rich and easily accessible de- 
posits of ore led to the creation of huge multi-national entities seek- 
ing to yield low-grade and diffuse deposits.1° These entities almost 
entirely eclipsed the lone, relentless frontiersman picking and pan- 
ning in the golden western sunset." Only after nearly fifty years of 
sometimes thoughtless, often ruthless, mining did it occur to the fed- 
eral government that the public domain, like the resources hunted, 
could be irreversibly depleted and exhausted, and that streams could 
be degraded, wildlife habitats de-stroyed, and aquifers polluted.12 It is 
now feared that billions of public dollars will be needed to reclaim 
these public lands.13 
Congress has revealed its second thoughts about the terms of 
the General Mining Law of 1872 and has considered its repeal on 
several occasions.14 In 1993, various bills were voted out of commit- 
where-if the price were [sic] right. The Forest Service and BLM undertook to find 
lands of equal value for exchange outside the boundaries of the recreation area. The 
patented land is valued at $350,000 to $750,000, but the owners believe the site's 
potential mineral value is about $12 million. Since the claimants obtained the pat- 
ented land for the 1872 mining law price of $5 an acre-about $1,950 total-it is 
no wonder that this incident has become known as sandscam. 
137 CONG. REC. S2015-16 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991). 
Currently, miners pay no royalties to the United States government for any minerals ex- 
tracted from public lands. In 1989, the total value of non-fuel mineral production in the 
United States was $32.3 billion. Id. S2016. It is estimated that between $3.9 billion and $6.1 
billion of the total is derived from public lands. Id. 
10. See McCloskey, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
1 I .  The United States Geological Survey studies show that small miners represent only 
one percent of the total. See generally MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NON-FUEL MINERALS IN 
FEDERAL AND (Office of Technology Assessment ed., 1979); McCloskey, supra note 9, a t  13 
(testimony of Mr. McCloskey before the House lnterior Subcommittee on Mining and Natural 
Resources, June 23, 1987). 
12. The first act to halt the depletion of certain resources was the Mineral Leasing Act 
of 1920. 30 U.S.C. $ 181 (1988). While the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 gave the 
Forest Service the authority to regulate mining activities to prevent "undue degradation" or 
damage to surface resources, it was not until 1974 that the Forest Service promulgated any 
regulations. 16 U.S.C. $$ 475, 551 (1988). 
13. The General Accounting Office has found that more than 420,000 acres in eleven 
western states are yet unreclaimed because of mining activity including the pile-up of mining 
wastes and the contamination of rivers, lakes and soil by cadmium, nickel, lead, mercury, and 
arsenic. 137 CONG. REC. S2017 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, An Assessment of 
Hardrock Mining Damage, April 1988). Of this amount, more than 280,000 unreclaimed 
acres relate to abandoned, suspended, or inauthorized mining operations. Id.  "Over [one hun- 
dred] sites on the Superfund national priority list are mining related and the cost for cleaning 
up these sites could reach billions of dollars." Id. (quoting Bureau of Mines, The Mineral 
Position of the United Stares 37 (1989)). 
14. One of the first attempts a t  reform was the recommendation of the Public Land 
Commission in 1880 that the Mining Law be completely rewritten. JOHN D. LESHY. THE MIN- 
ING LAW. A STUDY I N  PERPETUAL MOTION 2 (1987). In 1920, most fuel and fertilizer miner- 
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tee in both houses of Congress.16 All of these bills would preserve the 
idea of a mining claim as a property right, but, in return, would 
significantly qualify and redefine the rights inhering in the mining 
claim. Certain provisions would condition the existence of the right 
on the production of commercial ore and assess a fee for the right's 
acquisition and retention; withdraw the right to obtain a patent to 
any lands in the public domain, even based on existing mining 
claims; and impose substantial economic burdens and environmental 
protection and reclamation requirements upon existing mining 
claims.I6 The proposed changes most significantly raise the question 
of an unconstitutional taking of property and the extent to which . 
Congress can qualify or redefine these property interests without the 
concomitant obligation of making just compensation to the owners. 
Part I1 of this paper offers an analysis of the new allocation of 
burdens and benefits in the use of public lands as contemplated by 
the proposed legislation. In Part 111, I discuss the acquisition of 
property rights under the General Mining Law of 1872. In Part IV, 
the theory of property in general is explained along with the types 
and nature of property interests inhering in, and arising from, a min- 
ing claim. I explain the recent efforts in Congress to reform the min- 
ing law in Part V and the concept of a taking of property in general 
in Part VI. I discuss the idea of a taking by redefinition in Part VII 
and in Part VIII, I deal with the question of whether the proposed 
legislation effects an unconstitutional taking of property. Conclusions 
are offered in Part IX. 
als like oil, gas, and oil shale were no longer covered by the Mining Law, but instead, came 
within the purview of the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. In 1922, a reform proposal was made by 
the federal Bureau of Mines and the Mining Metallurgical Society of America. Id. at  3. The 
major miners requested better security of title, more protection against nuisance locators and 
less red-tape. Id. The prospectors perceived this proposal as a means of denying them access to 
federal lands. Id. In the end, the prospectors won and the reform bill never emerged from 
committee. Id. A number of reform measures were introduced in Congress every year between 
1970 and 1978, but all such efforts proved unsuccessful. Id. at 67. The recent revival of inter- 
est in mining law reform, however, can be explained in part by the need for a framework for 
hardrock mineral development more consistent with contemporary environmental values and 
imperatives. See generally John D.  Leshy, Reforming the Mining Law: Problems and Pros- 
perfs, 9 P U B .  LAND L. REV. 1 (1988). 
15. The most substantial of these bills was H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) 
(also known as "The Mineral Exploration and Development Act of 1993"). 
16. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. 
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11. ACQUIRING PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE GENERAL MINING 
LAW OF 1872 
Under the General Mining Law of 1872,17 any citizen is free to 
explore the public lands in the hope of discovering valuable minerals 
(gold, silver, lead, copper and zinc) and to obtain title to the parcel 
of land in which such minerals are found.18 The original purpose of 
this overture was to encourage risk-takers to explore, discover, and 
develop both known and unknown mineral deposits for the general 
good and to settle the western United States.'@ It was thought that, 
where agricultural land was connected with mining lands, the miner 
would make improvements, cultivate the land, and raise crops, as 
well as mine.20 The desired result would be a more settled commu- 
nity that would protect the western frontier and facilitate the pro- 
duction of food and resources for the national good.21 
17. 30 U.S.C. 88 21-54 (1988). 
18. Id. See generally George E. Reeves, The Origin and Development of the Rules of 
Discovery, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1973). The law makes a distinction between "lode" 
mining claims, in which the valuable minerals occur in a vein held in place by the surrounding 
rock, and "placer" claims in which valuable minerals are loosely held in the general earth. 30 
U.S.C. $8 23, 35. The distinction is important in that the technical location requirements vary 
depending on the type of claim. 30 U.S.C. 8 23. The statute also places a twenty-acre limit on 
any mining claims, although no limit is placed on the number of claims an individual may 
hold. 30 U.S.C. 8 35. However, placer claims located by associations of individuals may be as 
large as 160 acres. 30 U.S.C. 8 36. See generally Terry Noble Fiske, Rush to  the Rockies: 
Some Aspects of Mineral Development of Non-Fee Land, 17 KAN. L. REV. 225 (1969); Rod- 
ney D. Knutson & Hal G. Morris, Coping with the General Mining Law of 1872 in the 19805, 
16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 411 (1981); Mark Squillace, The Enduring Vitality of the Gen- 
eral Mining Law of 1872, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10261 (1 988). 
19. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
20. Frank J. Barry, Discovery Under the Mining Laws, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 84, 89 (1966) 
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1872) (statement of Rep. Sargent). 
21. Id.; see also John C. Lacy, Historical Overview of the Mining Law: The Miner's 
Law Becomes Law, in THE MINING LAW OF 1872: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13, 
28, 34-35 (1989). Early prospectors simply took occupancy of public lands and adopted their 
own rules for locating, holding and working their claims. Gradually, local customs and rules of 
organized mining districts developed, and a few court decisions clarified the nature of a mining 
claim. See 1 CURTIS H. LINDLEY. A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES 
AND MINERAL ANDS 8 41 (2d ed. 1903). The first treatment of mineral rights by the Conti- 
nental Congress appeared in provisions for the sale of land by the government in the North- 
west Territory in the Land Ordinance of May 20, 1787, which provided that "there shall be 
reserved . . . one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines, to be sold, or otherwise 
disposed of as Congress shall hereafter direct." The provision was, however, not adopted by the 
Constitutional Convention. Lacy, supra at 16. 
As the new nation expanded westward, the policy of public land management was to 
convey lands to private ownership as quickly as possible without much thought of 
retaining lands for any specific purpose. The first major departure from this practice 
occurred in 1807 after the discovery of lead deposits in Missouri, Indiana Territory, 
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A mining claim arises upon the discovery of "valuable mineral 
deposits."22 An explorer perfects his mining claim by staking it and 
complying with the applicable statutory . and regulatory require- 
ments, such as recording notice of the claim.23 The claim then gives 
the discoverer "the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all 
the surface included within the lines of their  location^"^' as against 
all third parties except the United Statesz6 Though the United 
and Southern Illinois. At that time, through a series of enactments between 1807 
and 1832, lead mines and salt springs in public lands were reserved from sale . . . 
and a leasing system established. It wasn't long, however, before the experiment 
proved to be a failure as the cost of administering the system far outstripped reve- 
nues. The system was abandoned by a series of acts authorizing sales of lead mines 
and lands containing copper in 1846 and 1847. 
Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). 
The gold rush of 1848 prompted the consideration of legislation by Congress in 1849 and 
1850, although Congress failed to take any action to take control of the western mineral re- 
sources. Id. at 29. Meanwhile, local custom and state rules prevailed, though conflicts contin- 
ued. Id. at 30. The first mining law was enacted in 1866. The Placer Act of 1870 corrected a 
flaw of the 1866 Act by adding placer deposits into the category of minerals capable of being 
patented. Id. at 40. As previously stated, the General Mining Law was then enacted in 1872. 
Id. at 34, 40. Although history has demonstrated that mining has flourished best when the 
property and minerals were distinguished from the ownership of the soil, the recommendation 
of the Commissioner of Mineral Statistics was that the best policy for the United States would 
be to sell the surface along with the mines to avoid conflicts. Id. a t  38-40; see also LESHY 
supra note 14, a t  1-2. 
Subsequent to the passage of the 1872 Act, state statutes continued to be important in a 
variety of aspects. Some of these aspects included determining how claim boundaries were 
monumented; what, if any, "discovery work" was required a t  the time of location; how notices 
or certificates of location were posted and recorded; and how annual assessment labor was 
documented. See ROBERT G. PRUITT. JR.. DIGEST OF MINING CLAIM LAWS 5-13, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN MINING LAW FOUNDATION (1990). 
22. 30 U.S.C. $ 26. Under the "prudent man" test, a valuable mineral deposit is an 
occurrence of mineralization of such quantity and quality as to warrant a person of ordinary 
prudence in the expenditure of time and money in the development of a mine and the extrac- 
tion of the mineral. The mineral deposit that has been found must have a present value for 
mining purposes. The prudent man test is refined and complemented by the marketability test, 
which requires a showing that the mineral can be extracted, removed, and marketed at a 
profit. The marketability test reveals a claimant's intention to secure the land for the purpose 
of mining a valuable deposit, and it identifies more objectively the factors relevant to a deter- 
mination that a deposit is valuable. See generally Skaw v. United States, 2 CI. Ct. 795, 801 
(1983). cert. denied. 488 U.S. 854 (1988); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 661 n.4 
(1980); United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968); Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 
313, 322-23 (1905); Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Reeves, 
supra note 18, at 1; Carl J. Mayer. Comment, The 1872 Mining Law: Historical Origins of 
the Discovery Rule. 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 624 (1986). 
23. See 43 C.F.R. $ 3861.1-2 (1979). 
24. 15 U.S.C. $ 26 (1988). . 
25. While the claim offers the discoverer exclusive rights against third parties, rights 
against the United States are "conditional and inchoate." See United States v. Etcheverry, 230 
F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965); Skaw v. United States, 2 CI. Ct. 795, 800 (1983). 
Heinonline - -  6 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 90 1993 
1993) RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 91 
States retains title to the land, the claim is otherwise segregated 
from the public domain.2e 
After the discovery of the "valuable mineral deposits" and upon 
fulfillment of other. regulatory requirements, a mining claimant be- 
comes eligible to file an application for a patent.%' Claimants may 
only apply for a patent where they have assumed the requisite de- 
gree of risk.as Thus, to apply for a patent, expenditures on the claim 
must reach $100 annually and a t  least $500 cum~la t ive ly .~~  This 
concept and the requisite levels of expenditure have withstood more 
than 100 years of our country's general economic deve l~pment .~~  
111. THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the high point of classical 
liberal thought, the idea of property stood at the center of the con- 
ceptual scheme of lawyers and political  theorist^.^^ One celebrated 
theorist argued that: 
Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation 
of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to 
possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards 
it. 
Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only be the work of 
law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which guarantees it 
to me. It is law alone which permits me to forget my natural weak- 
Rights against the United States are governed by the doctrine of pedis possessio and the 
Mining Law of 1872. 30 U.S.C. ss 21-54. Pedis possessio doctrine protects the locator's rights 
as against all others during occupation and exploration. See Knutson & Morris, supra note 18, 
at 425-26; James A. Finberg, Comment, The General Mining Lmv and the Doctrine of Pedis 
Possessio: The Case for Congressional Action, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1027-28 (1982). The 
General Mining Law of 1872 restricts these protections by requiring that occupation be for the 
good faith purpose of prospecting, mining, or processing operations. 22 U.S.C. 8 612 (1988); 
see also United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968); United States v. Bagwell, 961 
F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1992). 
26. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); St. Louis Min- 
ing & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 655 (1898); Frecse v. United States, 
639 F.2d 754, 757 (Ct. C1. 1981). 
27. 30 U.S.C. 5 29; 43 C.F.R. 3s 3861.1-3864.1 (1988). 
28. 30 U.S.C. $8 28-29; 43 C.F.R. $8 3851.1. 3861.2-2 to 3861.2-5 (1988). 
29. 30 U.S.C. 28-29; see also Hickel v.  Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48. 55 (1970) 
(indicating that token assessment work does not substantially satisfy the requirements of sec- 
tion 28 of the General Mining Law of 1872). 
30. See Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before the Subcomm. on Mining and Natural Re- 
sources, 137 CONG. REC. S2014, 2016 (Sept. 6, 1990) (statement of Cy Jamison, Director of 
the Bureau of Land Management). 
31. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrarion of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXlI (J. 
Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1980). 
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ness. It is only through the protection of law that I am able to 
inclose a field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure, 
though, distant hope of harvest. 
A feeble and momentary expectation may result from time to 
time from circumstances purely physical; but a strong and perma- 
nent expectation can result only from law. That which, in the natu- 
ral state, was an almost invisible thread, in the social state becomes 
a cable. 
As regards property, security consists in receiving no check, no 
shock, no derangement to the expectation, founded on the laws, of 
enjoying such and such a portion of good. The legislator owes that 
greatest respect to this expectation which he has himself produced. 
When he does not contradict it, he does what is essential to the 
happiness of society; when he disturbs it, he always produces a pro- 
portionate sum of 
Bentham's notion that property is a basis of expectation, more 
than the physical thing, but involving a group of rights inhering in 
the person's relation to others with respect to the physical thing, is 
largely reflected in the concept of private property in the United 
States.33 This "liberal conception of property" holds that inhering in 
all property are six traditional rights: (1) right to possess; (2) right 
to exclude others, (3) right to use, (4) right to dispose of, (5) right to 
enjoy the fruits and profits, and ( 6 )  right to destroy or injure.84 
Not every economic, social, or other interest or advantage is, 
however, property. Property includes only those expectations or eco- 
nomic advantages which have a basis in law.36 An owner of property 
expects the community to prevent others from interfering with his 
actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifi- 
cation of his rights.36 For example, Bentham suggests that a person 
who has killed a deer may develop an expectation that, although he 
32. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 68-69. Willia'm Blackstone defined property as "that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (15th ed. 1809). That property 
consists of "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or 
diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 Id. at *138. 
33. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954); 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers & 
Proc. 1967). 
34. See Margaret J .  Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988). 
35. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); United States v. Wil- 
low River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). 
36. Demsetz, supra. note 33. at 347. 
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may lose possession at  the hand of a stronger rival, he should by law 
be entitled to its r e c o ~ e r y . ~ ~  
While first possession at  the early point in our history served as 
the original premise for property, others have since come to be ac- 
cepted with equal force. For example, a person who has created an 
intellectual or aesthetic work may develop certain expectations in re- 
lation to that Similarly, a person may develop an expectation 
if she contracts for certain  advantage^,^^ or if she utilizes a variety of 
government largess such as licenses, public land grazing rights, wel- 
fare benefits, and public land mining rights.40 
A. The Nature of a Mining Claim 
Several types of property interests may be said to arise out of a 
mining claim: a right of possession for unpatented mining claims 
(which is defeasible upon failure to comply with applicable federal 
and state laws);" an equitable fee simple title arising in land, claims 
on which a patent application has been filed and ~ompleted;'~ a legal 
fee simple title to the land within which the claim is founded after 
issuance of a patent; and an opportunity to obtain a patent.4s 
1. Unpatented Mining Claim 
An unpatented mining claim is regarded as a "unique form of 
37. BENTHAM, supra note 1 at 69. 
38. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918); see 
also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). John Locke's Labor theory is implicit in 
this rule and seems to underlie our patent and copyright laws. See supra note 194. 
39. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502 (1987) ("prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment [the contract clause] was the primary constitutional check on state legislative 
power"). 
40. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 745 (1964). In this 
important work, Reich states that government largess has given rise to a distinctive property 
law system. This system can be viewed from at least three perspectives: the rights of holders of 
largess, the powers of government over largess, and the procedure by which holders' rights and 
governmental power are adjusted. Id. 
41. Benson Mining & Smelting Co. v. Alta Mining & Smelting Co., 145 U.S. 428, 430 
(1892). Prior to the enactment of any formal legislation, the status of a miner on public land 
was little better than that of a mere trespasser since, by local rules and customs, a miner could 
acquire some nature of estate or interest in his claim. Duggan v. Davey, 26 N.W. 887 (Dakota 
1886). The interest was nonetheless regarded as real property. See, e.g., Hughes v. Devlin. 23 
Cal. 501 (1863); Merrit v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59 (1859). See generally CURTIS H. LINDLEY, LIND- 
LEY ON MINES (3d ed. 1914); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOP- 
MENT 699-763 (1968). 
42. Benson. 145 U.S. at 430. 
43. Id. at 431. 
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property," essentially, a "possessory right."44 The unpatented claim 
is 
property in the fullest sense of that term . . . . The owner is not 
required to purchase the claim or secure patent from the United 
States; but, so long as he complies with the provisions of the min- 
ing laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of owner- 
ship, is as good as though secured by patent.46 
As defined, an unpatented mining claim seems to be no more 
than one of the incidents which inheres in title under the liberal con- 
ception of property. In operation, though, the unpatented mining 
claim is more in the nature of other limited property rights, such as 
a servitude-a "profit a prendreW-which gives its owner some inter- 
est in lands owned by an~ the r . ' ~  The owner of this "profit a prendre" 
holds the right to use, but not possess, another's land by removing a 
portion of the land or its products (such as gravel, minerals, and 
timber)." A "profit a prendre" can be exclusive, giving the owner 
the right to exclude everyone else from using the profit.48 
At the same time, the unpatented mining claim, at  its inception, 
seemed like a fee simple title because it included the right of posses- 
sion, against even the United States and the general public. I t  was 
held to be "exclusive;" locators of valid mining claims, or valid loca- 
tions, obtained the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all 
the surface included within the lines of the claim's location.4B A 
party who was in actual possession of a valid location could maintain 
that possession and exclude everyone from trespassing thereon, and 
no one was at  liberty to forcibly disturb his possession or enter the 
44. Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); see also Wilbur v. United States ex 
rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930). 
45. Wilbur, 280 U.S. a t  316-17; see also Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 
334, 335 (1963); Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U.S. 445, 449 (1896); United States v. 
Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965); Duguid v. Best, 291 F.2d 235, 240 (9th Cir. 
1961). 
46. See Black, 163 U.S. at  451-52. 
47. In the United States, profits are generally governed by the same rules as easements. 
See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY g 450, Special Note (1944). 
48. Id. 
49. Delmonte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co.. 171 U.S. 
55, 83 (1898). The use of the word "exclusive" denotes congressional intent that locaton 
should have the right to exclude the general public. Id. at 69. "Exclusive" is defined as 
"[e]xcluding or having the power to exclude, or prevent entrance. debar from possession, par- 
ticipation or use; . . . limiting or limited to possession, control or use by a single individual, 
organization, etc." Id. at 74 (citations omitted). 
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premises.60 The unpatented mining claim is completely alienable and 
may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infring- 
ing upon any right or title in the United  state^.^' The right of the 
owner is taxable by the state and is "real property," subject to the 
lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territo- 
rial court.62 
However, unlike a fee simple title, an owner of an unpatented 
mining claim is limited in the purposes or uses to which she may put 
her claim-the claim is limited to mining purposes only.6s A claim- 
ant may not use public lands for grazing, harvesting, or residential 
 purpose^.^' Instead, the mining claim gives the locator only the right 
to explore for and extract minerals, and to purchase the land if there 
has been compliance with the provisions of the ~tatute.~"'To hold 
otherwise would permit the owners of a valid mining claim, with no 
intention of purchasing the fee, to strip the surface of the land of all 
of the valuable property and materials thereon to his own profit, and 
50. Id.; Wilbur, 280 U.S. at 315-16. The right of mining claimants to exclude has since 
been qualified. See infra notes 31 1-29 and accompanying text. 
51. Wilbur, 280 U.S. at  316. 
52. Id. 
53. In United states v. Langley, 587 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Cal. 1984), the United States 
brought an action for ejectment of persons occupying an unpatented mining claim located on 
public land in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest. Id. at 1259. The government alleged that 
the land at issue was part of the national forest and that the defendants, without right and in 
trespass, had moved onto, lived on, and occupied the lands and had situated a cabin or other 
structure on the land. Id. at 1259-60. The defendant argued that' it had a valid mining claim 
and, thus, the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of the surface within the lines of 
location, and that the structures and buildings on the mining claims on the land were used in 
connection with prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident 
thereto. Id. at 1264. The court found that the defendant had engaged in mining operations 
that would cause a significant disturbance on national forest land and that the maintenance of 
a residence would require an approved plan of operations pursuant to the applicable regula- 
tions. Id. However, the court denied the motion for a permanent injunction. Id. at 1267. It 
granted only an injunction against the maintaining of a residence and engaging in mining 
activity without an approved plan of operations. Id. 
54. In United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1965). the United States 
brought an action against the defendants to recover damages for alleged trespass on certain 
lands of the public domain and to enjoin further trespass. Id. at 194. Defendants leased the 
land from the owner of placer mining claims for grazing purposes and grazed cattle and sheep 
on the land. Id. One question before the court was whether the owner of a valid mining claim 
has the right to lease or to use the surface of the claim for the grazing of livestock not incident 
to the mining operations. Id. The court answered in the negative. Id. at 195-96; see also lckes 
v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. 
Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930); Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220 
(1904); St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650 (1898); Belk v. 
Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881). 
55. Efcheverry, 230 F.2d at 195. 
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then to abandon the claim."" This limitation also- means that if a 
once profitable claim ceases to produce a "valuable mineral deposit" 
according to the prevailing test,67 it may be said to have termi- 
nated.68 In light of the limited nature of this property interest, it 
seems that the right of destroying or injuring was never afforded a 
claimant. This conclusion seems to be required in light of a 1955 
amendment to the mining law which provided that mining claims are 
subject to regulations on use as may be adopted by the Secretary of 
the I n t e r i ~ r . ~ ~  
Under the General Mining Law, the owner of an unpatented 
mining claim is free to extract for her own profit and enjoyment all 
valuable minerals discovered: There are no charges, fees or royalties 
assessed on any amount of ore extracted. 
2. Patented Claim 
When a patent is issued, the mining claim is merged into the fee 
estate in the soil; the patentholder acquires title to the entire land, 
soil, and all minerals.e0 "It is the 'lands' in which mineral deposits 
are found which are 'open to purchase.' It is 'land' claimed and lo- 
cated for valuable mineral deposits, which is the subject of the appli- 
cation for patent, and where a patent of the United States issues, it 
is for the 'land,' a t  so much per acre."@' Nothing in the mining law 
limits or excepts from a patent those six rights inhering in a fee title 
to land under the liberal conception of property.64 Indeed, from the 
language of the statute, i.e., "[alny mining claim . . . shall not be 
used, prior to issuance of patent therefor, for any purposes other 
than prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasona- 
bly incident thereto,"e3 it follows that whereas a mining claimant is 
restricted to using the claim for mining purposes, once the claimant 
56. Id. 
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
58. Mulkern v. Hammitt, 326 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1964) (public land should not be 
allowed to become "perpetually encumbered and occupied by a private occupant just because, 
at  one time, he had there a valuable mine which has now been completely worked out"); see 
also United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.5 (10th Cir. 1975) (even a continued 
holding of the land for several years with little or no exploitation can raise a presumption that 
the original claim has been destroyed); Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D. Cal. 1981); 
Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F.Supp. 184, 190 (D. Ariz. 1972). 
59. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988). 
60. Deffeback v. Hawke. 115 U.S. 392 (1885); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1876). 
61. Duggan v. Davey, 26 N.W. 887, 890 (Dakota 1886). 
62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
63. 30 U.S.C. 8 612 (1988) (emphasis added). 
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obtains a patent, she is free to use her property for any purpose, 
including residential, recreational, farming, harvesting and gra~ing.~ '  
It also follows that a patentholder may cease mining activities and 
engage in any act otherwise harmful to the land, which might have 
been prohibited in connection with a mining claim, except to the ex- 
tent that such activities produce results which expose the 
patentholder to liability rules applicable to all landowners. Courts 
have affirmed the patentholder's right to use the land for non-mining 
purp~ses.~" 
The justification for this advantage lies more in history than in 
logic, for the value of the right to engage in non-mining uses may be 
greater than the fair return to the miner whose pre-patent mining 
activities have conferred a benefit on society. As the historical ac- 
counts indicate, the original thought was that title to the land would 
encourage settlement of the western frontier and agricultural pur- 
s u i t ~ . ~ ~  This is strong support for granting the patentholder a tradi- 
tional fee title. If the patent conferred upon the holder a title with 
use limitations, which were in addition to those imposed on all land- 
owners, then the patent would have little value. It would be the same 
as a mining claim. One advantage usually inhering in title that im- 
mediately comes to mind is security against other claimants. But this 
is no advantage over owning a mere claim, since staking and record- 
ing a claim upon discovery of minerals gives this security. The claim- 
ant has the right of exclusive possession at  least as to other miners 
(although no property interest is secure against adverse possessors). 
But the patentholder also has the right to exclude the government 
and the public from all manner of interference save those pertaining 
to all landowners. It appears that it was to encourage the settlement 
of the western frontier that these advantages were originally granted 
to patentholders. 
3. The Opportunity to Patent 
Is the "opportunity" to obtain a patent to land that contains the 
mining claim a pr'operty interest? Bentham offered that "property is 
nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving cer- 
tain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in conse- 
64. Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1989); Bales v Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 
150, 156 (E.D. Cal. 1981). 
65. Silbrico Corp., 878 F.2d 333. 
66. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
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quence of the relation in which we stand towards it."67 Consistent 
with this conception, the Supreme Court has eschewed any "wooden 
distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges,' " in favor of a definition 
of a "property interest" that "extend[s] well beyond actual owner- 
ship of real estate, chattels, or money."68 The Court has recognized a 
"purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those 
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance-that must 
not be arbitrarily ~ n d e r m i n e d . " ~ ~  This means that there may be a 
property interest in a government benefit to which one has come to 
expect and upon which one has relied, although a person must have 
more than a unilateral expectation of it. 
The Supreme Court first articulated this principle in the context 
of an employment relationship. In Perry v. S i n d e r r n ~ n n , ~ ~  an action 
brought against a state governmental unit, the Court recognized that 
the concept of a " 'property' interest in re-employment,"" "a legiti- 
mate claim of entitlement to job tenure"7a (at least for procedural 
due process purposes) stems from "rules and understandings, 
promulgated and fostered by [the employer] ."73 The Court explained 
that 
[a] written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evi- 
dence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim of 
entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient "cause" is 
shown. Yet, absence of such an explicit contractual provision may 
not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property" 
interest in reemployment." 
Instead, "[elxplicit contractual provisions'may be supplemented by 
other agreements implied from 'the promisor's words and conduct in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances.' "76 
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
68. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). 
69. Id .  at 577. 
70. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
71. Id.  at  601. 
72. Id. at  602. 
73. Id.  
74. Id.  at 601. 
75. Id. at  602. The basis for the understanding was found in the employer's official 
Faculty Guide, which included this provision: 
[The] College has no tenure system. The Administration . . . wishes the faculty 
member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are 
satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers 
and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work. 
Id. at 600. 
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With respect to mining claims, the Supreme Court has held that 
the right to purchase the land upon which a mineral location has 
been made by the possessor is not an equitable fee-simple estate in 
the premises,le which arises only upon completion of the application 
for patent and payment of applicable fees. However, under the lib- 
eral conception of property77 and Perry, the "opportunity to patent" 
may nonetheless be a legal property interest. The prospect of ob- 
taining a patent upon discovery of minerals and before an applica- 
tion for patent is filed is not unlike an interest in continued employ- 
ment because it, too, is not a mere unilateral expectation. Instead, as 
in Perry, it is a "legitimate claim of entitlement" stemming from 
rules and understandings-the mining law and custom. The mining 
law invites miners to explore for minerals, offering to those who ac- 
cept the venture and commit the required energies and capital not 
only the exclusive possession of the value of any minerals discovered, 
but also title to the land in which any minerals are found.7B 
It seems though, as discussed above, that in order for the offer 
of a patent to have any meaning, the patent must be seen as confer- 
ring advantages much larger and different in nature than the right to 
continue mining under a mining claim. No reason can be found in 
the legislative history to explain this reward which is in addition to 
the value of all minerals extracted and exclusive rights to extract 
them, except as an inducement to undertake the mining effort and as 
a furtherance of the national policy to populate and develop the 
west. Considering these dual national objectives, the opportunity to 
patent can be seen as a separate and distinct property interest, and 
as one which is as much a vested interest as the mining claim itself. 
The opportunity to patent, like the mining claim, is an advan- 
In addition, guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and 
University system provided that a teacher who had been employed as a teacher in the state 
college and university system for seven years or more had some form of job tenure. Id. 
However, "[plroof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to rein- 
statement. But such proof would obligate [the employer] to grant a hearing at his request, 
where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their suffi- 
ciency." Id. a t  603; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (recognizing an enforceable 
expectation of continued public employment in the state where the employer, by statute or 
contract, has granted some form of guarantee); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (rec- 
ognizing a "statutory expectancy" in continued employment in a civil service position). 
76. Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 49 F. 549, 552-53 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892). a r d ,  163 
U.S. 445 (1896) (citing Wirth v. Branson, 98 U.S. 118 (1878)); see also Hutchinings v. Low. 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77 (1872); Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187 (1869). 
77. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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tage and benefit of government largess, like grazing rights, licenses, 
and welfare benefits, whose availability, by definition, is subject to 
Congress' will, though not its whim. It is unquestionably within Con- 
gress' power to withdraw, at least prospectively, all public lands from 
mineral exploration. In an important work, Charles A. Reich consid- 
ered the general question of an individual's vested interest in the 
continued enjoyment of government largess.7B He explained that "[a] 
controversy over government largess may arise from such diverse sit- 
uations as denial of the right to apply, denial of an application, at- 
taching of conditions to a grant, modification of a grant already 
made, [or] suspension or revocation of a grant . . . ."80 According to 
Reich, courts have generally afforded "the greatest measure of pro- 
tection in revocation or suspension cases" on the theory that some 
sort of rights have "ve~ted."~' Courts have given the least amount of 
protection in denial of application cases where applicants have less at 
stake, and varying amounts of protection, to cases lying between 
these two extremes.82 On the whole, Reich points out that "individ- 
ual interests in [government] largess have developed along the lines 
of procedural protection and restraint upon arbitrary official action, 
[but] substantive rights to possess and use largess have remained 
very limited."8s This tenuous and conditional grant of protection 
may be explained by the idea that "largess does not 'vest' in a recipi- 
ent,"84 the benefits remaining revocable without compensation and 
subject to limitations on use as the public interest demands.86 Reich 
79. Reich, supra note 40, at 741. 





85. Id. at 744-45; see, e.g.. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The appellee in 
Nesror was an alien who had become eligible for old age benefits under the social security 
program in 1955 after having worked in the United States since 1936. Id. at 628-29 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). He was deported in 1956 under the Immigration and Nationality Act for hav- 
ing been a member of the Communist party from 1933 to 1939. Id. at 605. Since this was one 
of the grounds specified in 5 202(n) of the Social Security Act, the appellee's old-age benefits 
were terminated. Id. 
The question presented to the Court was whether a person eligible for social security 
benefit payments had an "accrued property interest" in those payments, the taking of which 
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court held that eligi- 
bility for social security benefit payments was not such an "accrued" property right, the "de- 
feasance" of which could be considered a violation of Due Process. Id. at 61 1. In so holding, 
the Court looked to the statutory scheme underlying the Social Security system and the pur- 
poses sought to be achieved by the Social Security Act. Id. at 608-1 l. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that if Social Security benefit payments were to be considered "accrued property 
Heinonline - -  6 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 100 1993 
19931 RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 101 
states: 
Reduced to simplest terms, "the public interest" has usually 
meant this: government largess may be denied or taken away if this 
will serve some legitimate public policy., The policy may be one 
directly related to the largess itself, or it may be some collateral 
objective of government. A contract may be denied if this will pro- 
mote fair labor standards. A television license may be refused if 
this will promote the policies of the antitrust laws. Veterans bene- 
fits may be taken away to promote loyalty to the United States. A 
liquor license may be revoked to promote civil rights. A franchise 
for a barber's college may not be given out if it will hurt the local 
economy, nor a taxi franchise if it will seriously injure the earning 
capacity of other t a ~ i s . ~ "  
While most of these public interest objectives are laudable, 
Reich points out that they ignore the existence of competing and 
often conflicting policies and that the regulation of government lar- 
gess to achieve a specific policy may undermine the independence of 
the i n d i v i d ~ a l . ~ ~  Reich argues for a "zone of privacy for each indi- 
vidual beyond which neither government nor private power can 
This means that: 
The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his 
license, and the welfare recipient his pension. These interests 
should be "vested." If revocation is necessary, not by reason of the 
fault of the individual holder, but by rkason of overriding demands 
rights," the Social Security system would be deprived "of the flexibility and boldness in adjust- 
ment to everchanging conditions." Id. at 610. In fact, the Act contains a clause expressly 
reserving to Congress the right to alter, amend or repeal any provision. Id. at 610-1 1. The 
Congress, however, is not free from all constitutional restraint. An arbitrary governmental 
action can be held to be violative of Due Process. Id. at 611. Here, in refusing to find a 
violation of the appellee's Due Process rights, the Court reasoned that one of the underlying 
purposes of the Social Security system was to increase the national purchasing power by pro- 
viding benefit payments to the disabled and the elderly. See id. at 612. This purpose of the 
system would be undermined if the payments were made to a person living abroad, as appellee 
was after deportation. Id. 
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, quoted a statement by Georgia Senator Walter F. 
George, Chairman of the Finance Committee, regarding the benefit payments as "an earned 
right based upon the contributions and earnings of the individual." Id. at 623 (quoting 102 
CONC. REC. 151 10 (1956)). The clause in the Act that gives Congress the "'right to alter, 
amend, or repeal any provision' of the Act," id. at 61 1, according to Justice Black, meant that 
the Act could "stop covering new people and even stop increasing obligations to its old contrib- 
utors." Id. at 624. But, it could not disappoint the "just expectations of the contributors to the 
fund." Id. at 624-25. 
86. Reich, supra note 40, at 774. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 785. 
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of public policy, perhaps payment of just compensation would be 
appropriate. The individual should not bear the entire loss for a 
remedy primarily intended to benefit the c~rnmunity.~~ 
These concerns for individual autonomy identified by Reich are 
perhaps not as compelling in the case of the mining claimant's op- 
portunity to patent. Yet, while the statute requires a financial invest- 
ment of a minimum of $500 to obtain a patent, the discovery of 
valuable minerals may, in fact, require a substantially greater invest- 
ment of energy and capital with the ever attendant risk that minerals 
may never be found, such that a prospector never becomes entitled 
to a patent. Though it is a calculated risk, the loss to the claimant is 
real. And, in accordance with Reich's views on conflicting policies, 
while the protection of the environment may well be the overriding 
public policy that requires the mining claimant to yield, the with- 
drawal of the opportunity to patent would not further that end be- 
cause a mining claim must be worked in order to remain a cogniza- 
ble property interest,BO but a patented claim need Hence, while 
a mining claimant does not need a patent to continue mining, ironi- 
cally, a claimant needs a patent in order to discontinue mining. 
4. Existing Uses and Valid Existing Rights 
The opportunity to patent may be viewed as a "valid existing 
right." Valid existing rights are often found in savings clauses of 
subsequently enacted legislation providing that the new legislation 
does not otherwise alter or eliminate rights already existing.!+' Con- 
gress has consistently failed to state the precise purpose of any valid 
existing right or savings clause; instead, it leaves the burden of inter- 
89. Id. 
90. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. 
91. See Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp. 184, 193 (D. Ariz. 1972) (citing 
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963)). 
92. See. e.g., Mineral Leasing Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. 5 182 (1988); Alaska National 
Interest Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 5 410hh-5 (1988); Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955, 30 
U.S.C. 5 612(b) (1988); Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. 5 1132(c) (1988); 
Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 5 131 1(b) (1988); Federal Land Policy Management Act 
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701(b) (1988); Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. 5 1901 (1988). 
Section 1910 of the Mining in the Parks Act provides: 
The holder of any patented or unpatented mining claim subject to this chapter who 
believes he has suffered a loss by operation of this chapter, or by orden or regula- 
tions issued pursuant thereto, may bring an action in a United States district court 
'to recover just compensation, which shall be awarded if the court finds that such 
loss constitutes a taking of property cornpensable under the Constitution. 
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pretation to regulators and the courts.93 The Courts have held that a 
determination of the existence and extent of valid existing rights re- 
quires a consideration of not only the language of the statute and 
legislative history where the statute is silent, but also interpretations, 
definitions and understandings prevailing at the time the rights were 
acquired."' Using this analysis, some courts have interpreted valid 
existing rights clauses to cover only uses then actually existing and 
not those merely potentially existing at the time the rights were 
acq~ired."~ 
The recent decision in Seldovia Native. Ass'n v. LujanB6 is in- 
structive on the interpretation of valid existing rights. The Alaska 
93. See generally James N .  Barkeley & Lawrence V. Albert, A Survey of Case Law 
Interpreting "Valid Existing Rights8'-Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1 (1988). 
94. For example in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 661 (1980). the Court de- 
cided the existence and scope of valid existing rights under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 
30 U.S.C. 5 181 (1988). which withdrew oil shale and several other minerals from the Gen- 
eral Mining Law of 1872 and provided that, thereafter, these minerals would be subject to 
disposition only through leases. A savings clause, however, preserved "valid claims existent at  
the date of the passage of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws 
under which [the Act was] initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, includ- 
ing discovery." Andrus, 446 U.S. at  659. It was argued that no claim was established under 
the marketability test adopted after the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. at 660-61. The Court held 
that the "present marketability" standard would not be used to determine whether a cogniza- 
ble property interest arose. Id. at 672-73. Rather, the Department of Interior instructions, 
which were issued just after the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, were the test 
to be followed. Id. at 673. 
95. In Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 999 (D. Utah 1979), "the United States 'filed 
suit . . . seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent Cotter Corporation . . . from engag- 
ing in any construction, road building, leveling land, or destroying primitive, scenic and wild- 
life characteristics on certain federal land.' " 
Cotter Corporation [was] a uranium mining and exploration company wholly 
owned by Commonwealth Edison, a public utility sewing Northern Illinois . . . . 
Cotter acquired . . . federal claims . . . located pursuant to the Mining Law of 1872 
. . . Cotter conducted drilling operations on federal land to the north and to the 
south of the lands at issue . . . . These operations indicated a "trend" of uranium ore 
between the two drilling points . . . . Cotter constructed access roads . . . but did not 
notify BLM [(the Bureau of Land ~ a n a ~ e m e n t ) ] ' o f  the construction activity . . . . 
[About six months later] Cotter began to construct a road across the land in ques- 
tion . . . in order to further its exploratory drilling. 
In the meantime, BLM proceeded with the inventory and wilderness area ex- 
amination required by FLPMA [(Federal Land Policy and Management Act)] . . . . 
BLM identified a portion of roadless unit UT-05-236 [(part of Cotter's federal 
claim)] as being appropriate for designation as a Wilderness Study area. 
Id. at 1000-01. 
96. 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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Statehood ActB7 authorized the State of Alaska to select acreage 
from public lands that were "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved 
at  the time of their selection" and thereafter "to execute conditional 
leases and to make conditional sales of such selected lands."B8 Pursu- 
ant to this authorization, the State created the "open-to-entry" 
("OTE") program, under which individuals could lease up to five 
acres of state land classified as OTE.Oe The lessees were then granted 
an option to purchase the land, which could be exercised after a sur- 
vey of the land was conducted and the purchaser paid to the State 
the fair market value of the lands as of the date of entry.loO The 
State issued OTE leases with conditional purchase options to the de- 
fendants in this case between 1968 and 1972,1°1 and "the Depart- 
ment of the Interior issued 'tentative approval' to the State only after 
'determining that there [was] no bar to passing legal title . . . . 9 ,,ioa 
Thereafter, the Seldovia Native Association ("SNA") submit- 
ted selections for lands, which came to include the OTE lands.lo3 
The Bureau of Labor Management ("BLM") then "vacated its ten- 
tative approval of OTE lands and approved their conveyance to 
SNA, subject to valid existing rights."lo4 The decision "was ap- 
pealed by SNA, the State, and several individual lessees to the 
Alaska Native Claims Appeals Board" (the "Board").lo6 The Board 
ruled that although the OTE leases were protected by the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Actloe ("ANCSA"), the purchase options 
97. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified as 
amended at 48 U.S.C. Ch. 2 (1988)). 
98. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1337-38 (quoting the Alaska Statehood Act, 48 U.S.C. Ch. 
2. §§ 6(b). 6(g) (1988)). 
99. Id. at 1338 (citing ALASKA STAT. 8 38.05.077 (3), (7) (1968)). 
100. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. 38.05.077(4) (1968)). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. The initial selections by the SNA did not include the OTE lands, but "the 
BLM notified SNA that SNA was required to select the OTE lands to ensure the 'compact- 
ness' of SNA's selection." Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. 43 U.S.C. $§ 1601-1629e (1988). ANCSA was enacted in 1971 to settle Alaskan 
natives' aboriginal claims to the land and resources of Alaska. See id. 1601. It provided that 
all prior conveyances of land under federal law or under the Statehood Act operated to extin- 
guish aboriginal title at the time of the conveyance and all remaining claims by Native Alas- 
kans based on aboriginal right, title, use or occupancy of the land as of the effective date. Id. 
1603. In consideration for the relinquishment of claims based on aboriginal title, Congress 
granted to Native Alaskans nearly $1 billion and 40 million acres of land. See id. $8 1605, 
161 1. ANCSA established a process whereby land would be withdrawn from selection by the 
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did not survive conveyance to Native Alaskans.lo7 The Board's order, 
however, conflicted with an earlier decision of the Interior Board of 
Land Appeals.loe To resolve this conflict, the Secretary of the Inte- 
rior issued an order concluding that conditional purchase options 
were valid existing rights under ANCSA.loB This meant that a 
lessee's right to exercise a purchase option was enforceable against a 
Native Village corporation such as SNA.l10 The Secretary later 
ruled that this should be applied retroactively to the OTE lands pre- 
viously conveyed to SNA.ll' In the ensuing action, the District 
Court accepted the Secretary's interpretation of valid existing rights 
under ANCSA and granted summary judgment for the federal de- 
fendants and the individual defendants.lla 
On appeal, SNA filed an action for declaratory relief seeking to 
invalidate the construction of ANCSA as adopted by the Secretary 
of the Interior1lS because "[tlhe Secretary's construction of ANCSA 
validated the State of Alaska's grant of leases with purchase options 
on land subsequently claimed by SNA pursuant to ANCSA."l14 
Furthermore, SNA sought an injunction against further enforcement 
pursuant to the invalid interpretation.l16 SNA argued that the 
purchase options were not "valid existing rights" and, therefore, 
could be extinguished under ANCSA.ll6 
The Ninth Circuit first noted that Congress had not defined 
"valid existing rights" in the text of ANCSA.l17 The court then 
State, made available for selection by Native Alaskans to fulfill their allotment, under 
ANCSA, and then conveyed to Native Alaskans. See id. 8 1603. 
Section 1610 of ANCSA provides: "The following public lands are withdrawn, subject to 
valid existing rights, from all forms of appropriation under the public land laws, including the 
mining and mineral leasing law, and from selection under the Alaska Statehood Act, as 
amended . . . ." Id. 8 1610. The effect of this provision was that the state could not grant OTE 
leases under the Statehood Act after passage of ANCSA. However, rights previously granted 
were protected as "valid existing rights." Seldovia. 904 F.2d. at 1340. 




11 1. See id. A year and a half later, the Secretary had reconsidered his first order and 
concluded that purchase options are valid existing rights under ANCSA 8 1 l(a)(2), 43 U.S.C. 
8 1610(a)(2). Id.; see also Secretarial Order No. 3029 (S.O. 3029), 43 Fed. Reg. 55287 
(1978). 




1 16. Id. 
117. Id. at 1341. 
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looked to the legislative history and found support for the conclusion 
that conditional purchase options were "valid existing rights."l18 The 
court noted that the Conference Report of the House and Senate 
Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs stated that "[all1 valid 
existing rights, including inchoate rights of entrymen and mineral 
locators, are protected."llB In the court's view, a conditional 
purchase option was an inchoate right.laO .However, because condi- 
tional purchase options were not expressly referred to in either the 
statute or legislative history, the court turned to an examination of 
the Secretary's construction of "valid existing rights" in general.12' 
The court found that the Secretary's construction was consistent 
with other judicial interpretations of the statute.la2 For example, in 
Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States,laS the Ninth Circuit re- 
viewed the Secretary's construction of "valid existing rights" under 
the same section of ANCSA. The Secretary had determined that 
townsite land in Alaska, which had been segregated but not yet sub- 
divided and distributed, was not available for Native Alaskan selec- 
tion under the Act.'=' The court agreed, asserting that the munici- 
palities had an entitlement to the lands under the townsite laws from 
the time the lands were segregated from the public domain.la6 The 
court explained: 
The term "valid existing rights" does not necessarily mean present 
possesqory rights, or even a future interest in the property law sense 
of existing ownership that becomes possessory upon the expiration 
of earlier estates. Legitimate expectations may be recognized as 
valid existing rights, especially where the expectancy is created by 
the government in the first instance.lpe 
Similarly, in Seldovia, the holders of conditional purchase options 
had legitimate expectations arising out of the Alaska Statehood Act 
and, according to the court, the leases issued pursuant to that Act 
should be protected as "valid existing rights."12' 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1341-42 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 746, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2250). 
120. Id. at 1342. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. 806 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1986). 
124. Id. at 926. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 926-27. 
127. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1343. 
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The Ninth Circuit found further support for its conclusion in 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar phrase in the context 
of the federal homestead laws.lZ8 In Stockley v. United States,lZB a 
presidential order withdrew certain lands from appropriation under 
the homestead laws, "subject to existing valid claims."lS0 The Court 
found that a homesteader's lawful entry upon land was excepted 
from this withdrawal order.lS1 The Stockley Court stated: 
Obviously, this means something less than a vested right, such as 
would follow from a completed final entry, since such a right would 
require no exception to insure its preservation. The purpose of the 
exception evidently was to save from the operation of the order 
claims which had been lawfully initiated and which, upon full com- 
pliance with the land laws, would ripen into a title.lg8 
Thus, "[blecause the preliminary entry gave the entryman an exclu- 
sive right of possession, his inchoate right to proceed to patent was 
protected."1ss Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in Seldovia, stated that 
"blust like a homesteader's preliminary entry, the grant of a condi- 
tional purchase option ripens into title upon compliance with the 
[State's] land laws."lS4 
A clear sense of the Supreme Court's attitude about the rights 
inherent in mining claims may be found in a case decided a few 
years after Stockley. In Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic,ls6 
a claimant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a 
patent.lS6 In 1919, the respondent and seven associates located a 
tract of land in Colorado under the name of Spad No. 3 placer 
claim.lS7 "The land contained valuable deposits of oil shale, and was 
open to appropriation under the mining laws."lS8 Spad No. 3 formed 
one of a group of six oil placer claims, all of which were located and 
owned by the same persons and were adjacent to one another.lSB In 
1920, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act, which withdrew 
128. Id. 
129. 260 U.S. 532 (1923). 
130. Id. at 536. 
131. Id. at 544. 
132. Id. 
133. Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1343 (citing Stockley, 260 U.S. at 544). 
134. Id. 
135. 280 U.S. 306 (1930). 
136. Id. at 316. 
137. Id. at 315. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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public lands containing 'deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil shale 
and gas from mining exploration, and permitted only leases.140 How- 
ever, the statute contained a savings clause protecting "valid claims 
existent [at the date of the passage of the Act] and thereafter main- 
tained in compliance with the laws under which initiated" and de- 
claring that the claims "may be.perfected under such laws, including 
Before 1921, the co-locators had already performed annual la- 
bor on three of the six claims amounting in value to more than $600, 
with the intention that the labor should apply to all six ~ 1 a i m s . l ~ ~  
The claimant subsequently acquired the interest of his co-locators in 
Spad No. 3 and performed the required assessment work until the 
aggregate value exceeded $500.148 On September 25, 1922, the 
claimant applied for a patent, complied with the statutory require- 
ments pertaining to the application process, and paid the purchase 
price.lJ4 Thereafter, a proceeding against the entry was instituted by 
the Land Office, which then declared the claim null and void on the 
ground of insufficient assessment labor for the year 1920.146 This 
holding was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.14" The claim- 
ant then applied for a writ of mandamus, which was denied by the 
District Court, ' which decision was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals."' 
The specific question before the Supreme Court was whether 
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 had the effect of extinguishing the 
locator's right to save his claim under the original location by resum- 
ing work after his failure to perform annual assessment labor.lJ8 The 
Court explained that "[wlhile [a claimant] is required to perform 
labor of the value of $100 annually, a failure to do so does not ips0 
140. 30 U.S.C. 5 193 (1988) provides: 
The deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, shale, and gas herein re- 
ferred to, in lands for such minerals . . . shall be subject to disposition only in the 
form and manner provided in this chapter, except as provided in sections 1716 and 
1719 of Title 43, and except as to valid claims existent on February 25, 1920, and 
thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated, which 
claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery. 
141. Id. 





147. Id. at 316. 
148. Id. 
Heinonline - -  6 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 108 1993 
19931 RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 109 
facto forfeit the claim, but only renders it subject to loss by reloca- 
tion.""" The Court further pointed out that "the law is clear that no 
relocation can be made if work be resumed after default and before 
such relocation."1s0 
This concession that "Spad No. 3 'as a valid claim existent on 
February 25, 1920,' [left] only [the] question [of] whether, within 
the terms of the excepting clause, the claim was 'thereafter main- 
tained in compliance with the laws under which initiated.' "Is1 The 
Court believed the owner's resumption of work, after his failure to 
do assessment work, meant a retention of the owner's claim except in 
cases where the United States intervened to challenge the c1aim.lsa 
The Court stated: 
"[The locator's] rights after resumption were precisely what they 
would have been if no default . . . in . . . doing [the] assessment 
[work had] occurred." Resuinption of work by the owner, unlike a 
relocation by him, is an act not in derogation, but in affirmance, of 
the original location; and thereby the claim is "maintained" no less 
than it is by performance of the annual assessment labor. Such re- 
sumption does not restore a lost estate . . . it preserves an existing 
estate.lSs 
This case is important not only for its instructive points on the 
annual assessment requirements, but also for its consideration of the 
import of the savings clause. The Court found that the savings clause 
of the Act preserved existing mining claims and that a mining claim 
gave not only the right to continue mining and extracting valuable 
mineral deposits (including the fossil fuels otherwise withdrawn by 
the Act), but also the right to obtain a patent to the land based on 
these existing claims.1s4 This means that the "valid existing rights" 
clause saved the mining claim as well as the right to apply for a 
patent based on these claims. ' 
149. Id. at 317. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 317-18. 
153. Id. at 318 (citing Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 283 (1881): Knutson v. 
Fredlund, 106 P. 200, 202 (Wash. 1910)) (emphasis added). 
154. See Wilbur. 280 U.S. at 317. 
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IV. REDEFINITION OF MINING CLAIM UNDER THE PROPOSED 
MINERAL. EXPLORATION A D DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1993 
In 1872, the tone of the General Mining Law,lSs as well as the 
government's attitude toward mining was one of laissez-faire; the 
government left it largely up to claimants and patentholders to de- 
termine how mining operations would be conducted.1se Nearly fifty 
years passed before Congress amended the General Mining Law or 
enacted new laws to increase the role of the government in control- 
ling the ways in which public lands were claimed and mined.lS7 
The most recent effort by Congress to control mining activities 
is the proposed "Mineral Exploration and Development Act of 
1993."'" The proposed Act restates the offer to any citizen to seek 
minerals in public lands and preserves the explorer's exclusive right 
of possession upon the location of valuable minerals.1sB The claim, 
however, is deemed abandoned unless the claim holder continues to 
maintain the sufficiency of the claim in accordance with the Act.leo 
Under the.proposed Act, the taking on of the risk of exploitation is 
no longer sufficient compensation to the United States for the use of 
its land. Instead, the proposed Act requires that the claim holder 
make certain payments to the Secretary. For example, under section 
103(d)(3), a locator must pay a location fee of twenty-five dollars for 
each unpatented mining claim located after the date of enactment of 
155. 30 U.S.C. 33 21-54 (1988). 
156. Humbach, supra note 5, a t  340. 
157. Id. 
158. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). H.R. 322 was passed in the House by a 
316 to 108 vote. Also, currently under consideration is S. 775, a more industry-friendly bill. 
See S. 775, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
159. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Section 101(a) provides "that mining 
claims may be located under this Act on lands and interests owned by the United States" 
pursuant to the terms of the Act. Section 103(a) sets forth the rules for locating a mining 
claim. Specifically, section 103(a) states "[a] person may locate a mining claim covering lands 
open to the location of mining claims by posting a notice of location, containing the person's 
name and address, the time of location . . . and a legal description of the claim." Accordingly, 
section 103(d)(l) provides that "[wlithin 30 days after the location of a mining claim pursu- 
ant to this section, a copy of the notice of location referred to in subsection (a) shall be filed 
with the Secretary in an office designated by the Secretary." 
160. Section 107(b)(I) of the proposed Act provides that "at any time, upon request of 
the Secretary, the claim holder shall demonstrate that the continued retention of a mining 
claim located or converted under this Act is exclusively related to mineral activities at the 
site." Section 107(b)(2) places the burden of proving the sufficiency of the claim on the claim 
holder. Accordingly, section 107(b)(3) states that "[alny mining claim for which the claim 
holder fails to demonstrate continued sufficiency, in the determination of the Secretary, pursu- 
ant to subsection (b) of this section. shall thereupon be deemed forfeited and be declared null 
and void." 
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the Act.lel Additionally, pursuant to sections 105(a)(l) and (2), an 
explorer must pay annual claim maintenance fees of $100 for con- 
verted claims, and of $200 for claims located pursuant to the Act.leP 
Section 306 of the proposed Act also requires that the claim holder 
pay a royalty fee of eight percent of the "net smelter return" to the 
United States as the Secretary prescribes.le3 Claims existing prior to 
the effective date of this Act will be converted to be covered by the 
proposed legislation (for all purposes except the right to patent).le4 
The proposed Act imposes substantial obligations upon existing and 
future claimants to minimize adverse environmental impact on the 
land,le6 and to reclaim mined land to a condition capable of support- 
161. Section 103(d)(3) also provides that such "location fee" must be paid to the Bu- 
reau of Land Management at the time of the recording of the claim. Furthermore, the Secre- 
tary of Interior would be authorized to set and collect "user fees a s  may be necessary to 
reimburse the United States for expenses incurred in administering" any and all requirements 
of the Act. H.R. 322, lO?rd Cong., 1st Sess. $ 402 (1993). 
162. Section 105(b) requires that the payment of claim maintenance fees be payable on 
or before August 31 of each year. Furthermore, section 105(e) allows for such fees to be 
waived for the "claim holder who certifies in writing to the Secretary that on the date the 
payment was due, the claim holder and all related parties held not more than 10 mining claims 
on lands open to location." 
Section 402 further states that "[tlhe Secretary and the Secretary of Agriculture are each 
authorized to establish and collect from persons . . . [any] fees as may be necessary to reim- 
burse the United States for the expense incurred in administering such requirements." 
163. Section 306(a) states that "any mining claim located or converted under this Act . . 
. shall be subject to a royalty of 8 percent of the net smelter return from such pioduction." It 
should be noted that section 105(h) allows for "[tlhe amount of the annual claim maintenance 
fee required to be paid under this section . . . [to] be credited against the amount of royalty 
required . . . under section 306 . . . ." 
164. Section 104(a) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on the effective date of this Act any 
unpatented mining claim for a locatable mineral located under the General Mining 
Laws prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall become subject to this Act's 
provisions and shall be deemed a converted mining claim under this Act. Nothing in 
this Act shall be construed to affect extralateral rights in any valid lode mining 
claim existing on the date of enactment of this Act. After the effective date of this 
Act, there shall be no distinction made as to whether such claim was originally 
located as a lode or placer claim. 
Sections 417(a) and (b) address the limitations placed on the issuance of patents for all 
types of claims located or converted under this proposed Act. 
165. Section 201 of the proposed Act deals with surface management standards. Section 
201 states: 
Notwithstanding the last sentence of section 302(b) of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, and in accordance with this title and other applicable 
law, the Secretary, and for National Forest System lands the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture, shall require that mineral activities on Federal lands conducted by any person 
minimize adverse impacts to the environment. 
Section 202(a) requires that "[nlo person may engage in mineral activities on Federal 
lands that may cause a disturbance of surface resources, including but not limited to, land, air, 
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ing uses which such lands were capable of supporting before the sur- 
face disturbances occurred.lB6 The proposed Act also requires the 
posting of financial guarantees for the estimated cost of reclamation 
prior to commencement of mining activitieslB7 and sets forth detailed 
reclamation standards.lB8 
V. TAKING PROPERTY AS THE LIMITS OF REDEFINITION 
Most Supreme Court cases that interpret the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth AmendmentlBe fall within two classes.17o "Where the gov- 
ernment authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually 
takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation."171 
The government effects such a per se taking, for example, when it 
floods a landowner's property,17a requires a landowner to suffer from 
the physical occupation of his premises by the installation of cable 
for television on his building,178 or destroys the use of land as a 
chicken farm by noise from low-flying military aircraft.17' However, 
a law that results in a transfer of wealth from a landowner to others 
or that deprives a landowner of some right of disposition (e.g., choos- 
ing tenants) does not establish a per se taking."" 
[Wlhere the government merely regulates the use of property, 
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose 
of the regulation and the extent to which it deprives the owner of 
the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has 
water (both ground and surface) fish, wildlife, and biota unless . . . (2) a permit was issued to 
such person under this title authorizing such activities." 
Section 203 deals with the obtaining of exploration permits. 
166. Section 207 contains the provisions on reclamation. The general rule on reclama- 
tion as set forth in 207(a) states: "[elxcept as provided under paragraphs (5) and (7) of sub- 
section (b), the operator [of a claim] shall restore lands subject to mineral activities carried 
out under a permit issued under this title to a condition" of natural topography and vegetation 
as existed prior to the disturbance of the surface. 
167. Section 206 requires a claimant to provide financial guarantees prior to the com- 
mencement of any mineral activity causing more than minimal disturbance to the environ- 
ment, to ensure the complete and timely reclamation of the mining area. 
168. The various reclamation standards for each type of mining activity are found in 
section 207(b)(l) through (10). Additionally, section 207(b) allows for the Secretary to pro- 
mulgate any necessary and further standards depending upon the type of mining performed. 
169. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
170. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992). 
171. Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 
(1982). Both of these cases will be discussed infra. 
172. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 'U.S. 166, 180 (1871). 
173. Lorerro, 458 U.S. at 438. 
174. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262, 267 (1946). 
175. Yee. 112 S. Ct. at  1529. 
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unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that 
should be borne by the public as a whole."17e 
Unlike the per se takings cases, which require courts to apply a clear 
rule, the regulatory takings cases "necessarily entail complex factual 
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government ac- 
t i o n ~ . " ' ~ ~  A government action that denies a property owner "some 
beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner's full 
exploitation of the property" will be upheld "if such public action is 
justified as promoting the general welfare."178 The Court "has been 
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice 
and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action 
be compensated by the government, rather than remain dispropor- 
tionately concentrated on a few  person^."'^^ Instead, the Court 
" 'has examined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as 
the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasona- 
ble investment backed expectations, and the character of the govern- 
mental action . . . . 9 9 , 1 8 0  
It was not until 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mah~n , '~ '  
that the Supreme Court recognized that, if the protection against 
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully 
enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests 
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by 
constitutional limits.'ea Thus, a government regulation which limits a 
landowner in the use of her property or requires her to perform par- 
ticular acts in the use of her property will not be upheld where it 
fails to "substantially advance a legitimate [government] interest," 
or has the effect of depriving the owner's property of an "economi- 
176. Id. at 1526; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123- 
25 (1978). 
177. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at  1526; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See generally 
Frank Michelman, Takings. 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); John R. Nolon, Foor- 
prints in rhe Shifring Sands of the Isle of Palms: A Practical Analysis of Regularory Takings 
Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1992). 
178. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 499 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 125-29. The Court will uphold "laws or programs that adversely aBect 
recognized economic values." Id. at 124. 
179. Penn Cenrral, 438 U.S. at 124. 
180. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)) (emphasis added). 
181. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
182. Id. at 413-15. 
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cally viable use."183 
A regulatory taking may also occur by the imposition of an ex- 
action-a "forced contribution to general governmental revenues . . . 
not reasonably related to the costs" of any governmental benefits or 
services p r 0 ~ i d e d . l ~ ~  Where there is such a nexus, an exaction is not 
a taking, but instead is often characterized as a "user fee."18The 
Court in United States v. Sperry Corp. held that, to avoid a takings 
finding, it is sufficient that the "user fee" be intended to reimburse 
183. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825, 834 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 
(1981). 
184. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980). This 
case considered the effect of "a Florida statute appropriating interest on funds deposited into a 
court registry by an interpleader complaint." United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 
n.8 (1989). "Florida law provided for both the deduction of a small percentage of the inter- 
pleader funds as a fee for services rendered by the clerk of the court and the deduction of 
interest earned on the funds." Id. at 62. The court struck down the law stating that "[ilt [was] 
obvious that the interest was not a fee for services, for any services obligation to the county 
was paid for and satisfied by the substantial fee charged . . . and described specifically . . . as a 
fee 'for services' by the clerk's office." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162. The 
Court "failed to discern any justification for the deduction of the interest other than the bare 
transfer of private property to the county." Sperry, 493 U.S. at 62. 
185. Sperry, 493 U.S. at 53, 63. In Sperry, the user fee was a charge for the use of an 
established Tribunal for the recovery of claims'against Iran. Id. The "user fee" was exacted 
"as reimbursement to the United States government for expenses incurred in connection with 
the arbitration of claims of United States claimants against Iran before the Tribunal and the 
maintenance of the Security Account." Id. at 60. "Prior to the 1979 seizure of the United 
States Embassy in Tehran, Sperry, an American parent corporation and its wholly owned sub- 
sidiary, entered into contracts with the Government of Iran." Id. at 53. "After the Embassy 
seizure, Sperry filed suit for claims against Iran in a [district] court and obtained a prejudg- 
ment attachment of Iranian assets." Id. "Subsequently, the United States and Iran entered 
into the Algiers Accords, which established, inter alia, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(the "Tribunal") to arbitrate Americans' claims against Iran, specified that Tribunal awards 
are final, binding, and enforceable in the courts of any nation, and placed $1 billion of Iranian 
assets in a Security Account for the payment of awards to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and thence to claimants." Id. "After Executive Orders implementing the Accords invali- 
dated Sperry's attachment and prohibited it from further pursuing its claims in American 
courts, Sperry filed a claim with the Tribunal and ultimately entered into a settlement agree- 
ment whereby Iran promised to pay it $2.8 million . . . ." Id. "Congress then enacted section 
502 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, . . . which require[d] the Federal Reserve 
Board to deduct a percentage of the [claimant's] award [and pay the United States Treasury] 
"as reimbursement to the . . . Government for expenses incurred in connection with the arbi- 
tration of claims . . . before [the] Tribunal and the maintenance of the Security Account." Id. 
"When the Federal Reserve Board so deducted a percentage of Sperry's award, Sperry re- 
newed a suit it had previously filed in the Claims Court, arguing that the deduction authorized 
by section 502 was unconstitutional." Id. "The [lower] court rejected the claim and dismissed 
the suit, but the Court of Appeals reversed." Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit. See Sperry Corp. v. United 
States, 925 F.2d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1991). eerf. denied, 112 S. Ct. 53 (1991). 
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costs incurred by the government, and it is not necessary "that the 
amount of [the] user fee be precisely calibrated to the 'use that a 
party makes of government services,"lB6 but only that it is a !'fair 
approximation of the costs of benefits supplied."lB7 
The question of taking by financial exaction has also arisen in 
the context of land use impact fees.lB8 An impact fee is lawful and 
not a taking where the fee bears a rational relationship to a legiti- 
mate public purpose.lB9 "For example, courts .have sustained require- 
ments that [land] developers construct various on-site improvements, 
such as sewers, water mains, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, storm 
drains, and l ands~ap ing . "~~~  "Requiring off-site improvements that 
serve a public purpose, such as roads, schools, parks and sewage 
treatment plants, may also be justified where the requirement allevi- 
ates a public burden or ameliorates harmful effects caused by 
development."lgl 
186. Sperry, 493 U.S. a t  60. 
187. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 11.19 (1978)). In 
Massachusetts, the Court: 
upheld a flat registration fee assessed by the Federal Government on civil aircraft, 
including aircraft owned by the States, against a challenge that the fee violated the 
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity. In holding that the.registration charge 
could be upheld because it was a user fee rather than a tax, the Court rejected 
Massachusetts' argument that the "amount of the tax is a flat annual fee and hence 
is not directly related to the degree of use of the airways." The Court recognized 
that when the Federal Government applies uscr charges to a large number of par- 
ties, it probably will charge a user more or less than it would under a perfect user- 
fee system, but we declined to impose a requirement that the government "give 
weight to every factor affecting appropriate compensation for airport and airway 
use." 
Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted). In Sperry, the court found that the fees were not "so clearly 
excessive as to belie their purported character as uscr fees." Id. at 62. 
188. See generally Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Im- 
pact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. ROBS. 51 (1987); Brian W. 
Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The Second Generation, 38 WASH. U .  J. URB. 
& CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990). 
189. Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). 
190. Id. at 876-77. 
191. Id. at 877. In Commercial Builders. the court addressed the constitutionality of a 
city ordinance which: 
imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of permits for non-residential develop 
ment of the type that will generate jobs. The fees were to be paid into a fund to 
assist in the financing of low-income housing. In challenging the ordinance, Com- 
mercial Builders conceded that the city had [a legitimate interest in expanding low- 
income housing, but argued that the ordinance constituted] an impermissible means 
to advance that interest because it places the burden of paying for low-income hous- 
ing on non-residential development without a sufficient showing that non-residential 
development contributed to the need for low-income housing in proportion to that 
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A. Evolving Public Values in the Ad Hoc Analysis 
The development of an ad hoc analysis for regulatory takings 
cases indicates a change in public values that many argue have and 
should advise takings jurisprudence.le2 Of particular importance is 
the idea that "land and natural resources are our common heritage, 
to which we all have equal claims,"1e3 and which are "not properly 
subject to claims of ownership in perpetuity, but must be managed in 
such a way that all people in all generations share their benefits."le4 
The idea of evolving public values may be the only way to ex- 
plain and reconcile recent takings cases with longstanding principles. 
burden. [The Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court in upholding the ordinance 
based on the fact that the ordinance] was enacted after a caieful study revealed the 
amount of low-income housing that would likely become necessary as a direct result 
of the influx of workers that would be associated with the new non-residential 
development. 
Id. at 873-74. The court found that the assessment was not excessive but bore a "rational 
relationship to a public cost closely associated with such development." Id. at 874; see also 
Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991). 
192. See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1714, 1723 (1988). 
193. Id. at 1723. 
194. Id. Tideman quotes a famous passage by John Locke that addresses whether "any- 
one [can] properly use land if no one can properly claim to own land": 
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it 
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state 
Nature placed it in, hath by this Labour something annexed to it, that excludes the 
common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of 
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned [sic] to, 
at least where there is enough, and as good left in common/or others. 
Id. at 1723-24 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. SECOND TREATISE 
$ 27 (1960)). 
Tideman argues that "the finiteness of land makes all claims to perpetual possession in- 
consistent with Locke's proviso." Id. at 1724. He states: 
Natural resources share with land the quality of being provided by nature, but 
differ from land in that they are exhaustible. Therefore the application of Lockean 
principles to natural resources requires separate treatment. 
. . . Any person's claim upon exhaustible natural resources is consistent with 
Locke's proviso if the value of the claim does not exceed a person's dividend under 
such a rule. Locke's proviso thus constrains the claims that people can make upon 
land and natural resources, but it does not impose impossible constraints. 
Id.; see also John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989); 
John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
31 1 (1987); E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear it /or Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on 
Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1987); Joseph L. Sax, Why We Will 
Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conception of Private Property, 1983 
UTAH L. REV. 3 13. 
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In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,le6 the Supreme Court declared 
invalid, as applied to the facts of the case, a Pennsylvania statute 
that required. that a certain amount of coal be left in place during 
the underground mining of coal to protect the surface from subsi- 
dence.lB6 At the time, "the coal companies had owned vast areas of 
land . . . [and] had sold much of th[e] land, reserving not only [the 
rights to] the coal, but 'the right to . . . remove the [coal]' " with 
immunity from any liability for any damage occasioned by its re- 
moval.lB7 In other words, the coal companies reserved a specific 
property interest: the right of subjacent support, or the right to with- 
hold from sale.lB8 After passage of the Kohler Act in 1921,189 a 
homeowner successfully sued to enjoin the mining of coal that 
threatened to cause subsidence resulting in the collapse of his private 
residence.200 The Pennsylvania court found that the Kohler Act, cre- 
ated to prohibit mining that would cause any subsidence under land 
improved by buildings or roads, was a proper exercise of the police 
power in light of the legislative finding that the enjoined activity 
threatened the health and safety of a large number of people.201 The 
lower court ruled that the exercise of the police power precluded any 
claim that the Act effected an unconstitutional taking.202 The clear 
effect of this ruling was that the coal companies could not continue 
mining under or adjacent to land where the surface rights were not 
195. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For an interesting and thoughtful discussion of the history, 
politics, and philosophy of this case, see E. F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 287 (1986). 
196. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 393. 
197. Roberts, supra note 195, at 288; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at  395. 
198. Hugh G. Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and 
the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 1 (1951); see Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 
218 (W. Va. 1982); McCabe v. City of Parkersburg, 79 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1953). See gener- 
ally RICHARD POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 63 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., rev. ed. 
1986). 
199. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 88 661-71 (1966). The Kohler Act was a legislative re- 
sponse to the ruling in Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820 (Pa. 
1917), that a coal company can continue mining under a schoolhouse, regardless of the danger 
that it may collapse, because the coal company owned both the mineral estate and the right of . 
support, and the exploitation of both of these property interests did not amount to a public 
nuisance. Id. at 820-21. 
200. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491 (Pa. 1922), rev'd, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 493-94. In Roberts' view, the perceived difference in result between Mahon 
and Keator was that in Mahon there had been a legislative finding of public nuisance. See 
Roberts, supra note 195, at  289. 
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also owned by the coal companies.a08 
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Act "purport[ed] 
to abolish what [was] recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in 
land," the right of support, which the coal companies withheld in the 
sale of the surface estate.%"' By abolishing this property interest, the 
Act transferred a benefit to the community, but at no cost to the 
community.a06 The Court reasoned that if this could be done, the 
public in similar situations would always resort to police power to 
take away an individual's property in lieu of the eminent domain 
power, and consequently, the institution of private property itself 
would be in jeopardy.a06 
Sixty-five years later, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedicti~,~~' the Court ruled on essentially the same question. A 
Pennsylvania statute required that substantial amounts of coal be 
left in place when mining under public buildings, non-commercial 
buildings used by the public such as churches and dwellings, streams 
and reservoirs.20B The Act's preamble sets out the public purposes to 
be served, including "the conservation of surface land areas which 
may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal . . . , to enhance 
the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of 
surface water drainage and public water supplies, and generally to 
improve the use and enjoyment of such lands."20B 
Keystone argued that the Act was invalid "on its face" because 
it violated both the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.210 Keystone relied on Pennsylvania Coal Co., ar- 
guing that it was indi~t inguishable .~~~ The District Court, the Court 
of Appeals, and the Supreme Court all held that Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. was indeed distinguishable and upheld the validity of the Act.%'% 
203. Consider Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively 
preventing continued operation of a quarry in a residential area was not a taking); Hadacheck 
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of a brick mill in a residential area 
was not a taking); Reinmanv. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (declaration that a 
livery stable constituted a public nuisance rather than a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887) (statute which prohibited operation of brewery was not a taking). 
204. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. a t  414. 
205. Id. a t  415-16. 
206. Id. at  413. 
207. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
208. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. QQ 1406.1 -1406.21 (Supp. 1994). 
209. Id. Q 1406.2. 
210. Keystone. 480 U.S. a t  474. 
21 1. Id. at  474, 481-84. 
212. Id. at  474. 
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The distinction rested on several grounds.a13 First, the "public 
interest" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. that would justify the abolition of 
a particular estate in land was not shown; instead the case centered 
on a threat to a private house.a" Any other discussion of the validity 
of the Kohler Act was advisory only.216 Second, the "public purpose" 
of the statute in Keystone, in contrast to the Kohler Act in Pennsyl- 
vania Coal Co., was clearly e~tabl ished,~~" bringing Keystone within 
the line of cases including Mugler v. Kansas,217 Hadacheck v. Se- 
b a ~ t i a n , ~ ~ ~  and Reinman v. City of Little Rock,a1B which, according 
to Justice Stevens, were not overruled by Pennsylvania Coal CO.~'O 
Third, in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the finding was that the Kohler 
Act made mining of certain coal "commercially irnpra~tical,"~'~ 
whereas in Keystone, the "petitioners [had] not shown any depriva- 
tion significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one 
alleging a regulatory taking."aea Since the "record indicate[d] that 
only about seventy-five percent of [Keystone's] underground coal 
[could] be profitably mined," 'petitioners failed to show that their 
"reasonable 'investment-backed expectations' ha[d] been materially 
affected by" the requirement of leaving in place a small percentage 
"to support the structures protected by" the statute.2e3 Last, the 
Court explained, the "support estate" allegedly taken from the peti- 
tioners should not be viewed "as a distinct segment of property for 
'takings' purposes," and, even if so viewed, the record contained no 
evidence of "what percentage of the purchased support estates . . . 
ha[d] been affected by the Act."ae4 Accordingly, the Act met both 
the legitimate end and reasonable means test standards for takings 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 487-88. 
215. Id. at 484. 
216. Id. a t  485-88. 
217. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
218. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
219. 237 U.S. 171 (1915). 
220. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490. 
221. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. a t  414-15. 
222. Keystone. 480 U.S. at 493. 
223. Id. at 499. 
224. Id. at 501. Justice Stevens went on to reject the Contracts Clause argument, stat- 
ing that the Court had consistently refused to construe it literally when the challenged legisla- 
tion is "addressed to the legitimate end of protecting a basic interest of society" and "the 
legislature's adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon 
reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the 
legislation's] adoption." Id. at 503-05. 
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As Justice Scalia pointed out in the most recent regulatory tak- 
ings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,22B the holdings 
in Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal Co., are virtually identical on 
the facts, and therefore are apparently irre~oncilable.~~' In Lucas, 
Justice Scalia stated: 
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economi- 
cally feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule 
does not make clear the "property interest" against which the loss 
of value is to be measured . . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty 
regarding the composition of the denominator in our "deprivation" 
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court. 
Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon . . . (law restricting 
subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a taking) with Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis . . . (nearly identical law 
held not to effect a taking); . . . The answer to this difficult ques- 
tion may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been 
shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what 
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protec- 
tion to the particular interest in land with respect to which the tak- 
ings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.4a8 
If the last sentence of the quoted section is to be taken literally, 
then, it is quite evident that the result in these later cases results 
from the evolving standard, or a t  least a changing notion about the 
meaning of property (from the liberal conception to one requiring 
accommodation), and not from lawyering or the artful framing of 
the 
225. Id. at 506. 
226. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
227. Id. at 2894 n.7. 
228. Id. (citations omitted). 
229. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The 
idea of changing public values seemed particularly important in Penn Central. Id. There, the 
Court considered whether the city's landmark preservation ordinance as applied to Grand Cen- 
tral Terminal effected a taking. Id. at  107. Under the ordinance, any plan to alter the exterior 
of a building designated as an historic landmark had to be approved by the Landmarks Preser- 
vation Commission. Id. at 112. Penn Central sought to alter the exterior of the terminal by 
constructing a skyscraper over it, which would increase the income from the site, but would 
also substantially change the character of the terminal building. Id. at 116. The Commission 
denied a permit for the plans. Id. a t  117. Penn Central sued in state court, alleging that the 
application of the ordinance effected an impermissible taking without compensation. Id. at 
119. The trial court granted injunctive relief, but no damages. Id. The appellate court re- 
versed, and then the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court, having found 
that no taking had occurred because a mere reduction in value, unaccompanied by a transfer 
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VI. "DERANGEMENT T O  THE EXPECTATION" BY REDEFINITION 
A. Context, Relativity, Accommodation, and the Community 
In the context of a discussion of radical developments in water 
law in C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~ ~  one scholar, Professor Eric T. Freyfogle, offered 
"the best glimpse of the future of property law," a chapter in a 
"story of context and relativity, of accommodation and commu- 
n i t ~ . " ~ ~ l  Freyfogle studied the recent California case of In re Water 
of Hallett Creek Stream System,2a2 and the central concerns raised 
to the government, is not a taking. Id. at  119-21. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in a six to three 
decision. Id. at 106. Justice Brennan's majority opinion included an admission that the Court 
has been "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' re- 
quire that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, 
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. at  124. Justice 
Brennan goes on to review the Court's takings cases and to identify "several factors that have 
particular significance" in such cases: (1) "[tlhe economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct in- 
vestment-backed expectations;" (2) "the character of the government action," noting that "[a] 
'taking' may more readily be found when the interference . . . can be characterized as a physi- 
cal invasion by government"; and (3) whether they are "government actions that may be char- 
acterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions." Id. at 
124-28. 
Justice Brennan rejected the takings claim because "the law [did] not interfere with what 
must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel," and 
Penn Central was able "to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment" in the terminal site. 
Id. at 136. Moreover, the record did not show that Penn Central would be unable to use some 
of the air space above the terminal, "since [it had] not sought approval for the construction of 
a smaller structure" than the one first proposed and its air rights were made "transferable to 
a t  least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found 
suitable for the construction of new office buildings." Id. at  137. The ability to transfer its air 
space development rights would "undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens" the law 
ha[d] imposed on [Penn Central]," even if it did not constitute "just compensation." Id. The 
Court explicitly rejected the view that the police power can only be exercised in order to pre- 
vent "harm" to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Id. at  125. Instead, it is a proper 
exercise of this power where the governmental purpose is "substantially related to the promo- 
tion of the general welfare." Id. at 138. 
230. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied 
sub nom. California v. United States, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). The California Supreme Court 
ruled that the federal government, as owner of nearly half the land in the state, held riparian 
water rights on the lands it set aside for particular federal purposes, but that the extent of 
rights were determined with reference to the interests of other water users. Id. at 327. 
231. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989). Freyfogle points out that the "law of surface water, at least 
[today] in California, bears little resemblance to our traditional conception of property"; that 
"[a]utonomous, secure property rights have largely given way to use entitlements that are 
interconnected and relative." Id. He predicted that "[plrivate property in the coming decades, 
. . . might well exist principally in the form of specific use-rights. . . . [where] rights [are] 
defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar rights held by other people." Id. at 1530-31. 
232. 749 P.2d 324. 
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by the case as to "how far a state can go in redefining the attributes 
of private property ownership," without incurring the obligation to 
make just compensation.233 Freyfogle "asks us to consider the differ- 
ence[~] between regulating the use of a piece of property and rede- 
fining what it means to own that property in the first place."234 The 
author points out that Hallett Creek and its predecessors "reflect the 
court's power to control water use by changing the underlying defini- 
tion of water rights rather than by regulating their exercise."2s6 
Freyfogle interprets the new California water rights model "as con- 
comitant to the rise of the community and the decline of the individ- 
ual in American law and political culture, . . . [which view] replaces 
the classical liberal focus on individual autonomy and economic free- 
d ~ m . " ~ ~ ~  Thus, "[bly recovering for the public the right to prohibit 
particular practices and to decide when and where new uses will oc- 
cur, California ha[d] disaggregated the owner's bundle and recov- 
ered many of the entitlement sticks for public holding."237 Thus, af- 
ter Hallett Creek, "water rights in California are no longer 
autonomous;" but are constrained by "the reasonableness limit, pub- 
lic trust doctrine, and the no-harm rule."a38 Water rights require 
"sharing and accommodation" and contain a "temporal dynamism" 
(i.e., one that may be limited as circumstances change).ass Freyfogle 
applauds this approach, and supports William Kittredge's argument 
for a "new myth of property ownership" with an emphasis on con- 
text and accommodation; one that recognizes that "we never owned 
all the land and water . . . [and that] [olur rights to property will 
never take precedence over the needs of society."240 
As Freyfogle notes, Hallett Creek illustrates a growing depar- 
ture from the liberal conception of pr~perty,~" a shift by redefinition 
of the essence of the property interest; a shift that is achieved in a 
fashion that is less specific, but more encompassing than particular 
regulations which prohibit particular conduct. A redefinition presents 
233. Freyfogle, supra note 231 at 1531. 
234. Id. at 1531 (emphasis in original). 
235. Id.  at 1538. "[Tlhe road to Halleft Creek represents California's evolving assertion 
of control over the process of defining water rights." Id. at 1546. 
236. Id. at 1545. 
237. Id. at 1546. 
238. Id. at 1541. 
239. Id.  at 1541-42. 
240. Id. at 1555-56 (citing WILLIAM KITTREDGE, OWNING IT ALL 62, 64 (1987)). 
241. Id. at 1545; see also Sax, supra note 194 (arguing that changing public values have 
increased doubt about the extent to which rights of development should pass into private 
hands). 
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a new theory allowing new variables and new limits. The extent to 
which a property interest may be redefined without constitutional 
implications depends upon many factors, but of particular note is the 
nature of the property interest involved. In the case of United States 
v. L o ~ k e , ~ ~ ~  the Court explored the degree of permissible disturbance 
to rights in mining claims by redefinition as it considered the validity 
of the annual filing obligation under the Federal Land Policy and 
~ a n a ~ e m e n t  Act of 1976 ("FLPMA").24s In Locke, "[a]ppellees, 
four individuals engaged 'in the business of operating mining proper- 
ties in Nevada,' purchased in 1960 and 1966 ten unpatented mining 
claims on public lands near Ely, Ne~ada."~" "These claims were 
major sources of gravel and building [material which were] valued 
at  several million dollars, and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year 
alone, appellees' gross income totaled more than $1 million."246 Dur- 
ing the period in which they owned the claims, "appellees complied 
242. 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
243. Id. at 86, 88-89 (citing 43 U.S.C. $ 1744 (1976)). The Act requires recording of 
mining claims, and renders void those that are unrecorded. Id. at  89. Prior to the passage of 
this Act, in the absence of a federal recording system and because of the existence of many 
dormant mining claims, 
federal land managers had to proceed slowly and cautiously in taking any action 
affecting federal land lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully 
disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") proposed a sale or 
other conveyance of federal land, a title search in the county recorder's office was 
necessary; if an outstanding mining claim was found, no matter how stale or appar- 
ently abandoned, formal administrative adjudication was required to determine the 
validity of the claim. 
After more than a decade of studying this problem in the context of a broader 
inquiry into the proper management of the public lands in the modern era, Con- 
gress, in 1976, enacted the FLPMA . . . . 
Id. at  87. Under the Act, as it was a t  the time of the Loeke dispute, the Department of the 
Interior's Bureau of Land Management is responsible for managing the mineral resources on 
federal forest lands. See 43 U.S.C. $ 1701 (1976). "Section 314, [of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 
$ 17441 establishes a federal recording system that is designed both to rid federal lands of 
stale mining claims and to provide federal land managers with ugto-date information that 
allows them to make informed land management decisions. Locke, 471 U.S. a t  87. 
"For claims located before FLPMA's enactment, the federal recording system impose[d] 
two general requirements." Id. at 87-88. "First, the claims must initially be registered with the 
BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's enactment, a copy of the official record of the 
notice or certificate of location." Id. Second, in the year of the initial recording, and "prior to 
December 31" of every year after that, the claimant must file with state officials and with 
BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the 
claim, or a detailed reporting form. Id. at  89. Section 1744(c) "provides that failure to comply 
with either of these requirements 'shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment 
of the mining claim . . . by the owner.'" Id. at 89 (citing 43 U.S.C. $ 1744 (1976)). 
244. Locke, 471 U.S. at 89. 
245. Id. 
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with annual state-law filing and assessment work  requirement^."^^^ 
Additionally, "appellees satisfied FLPMA's initial recording require- 
ment by properly filing with BLM a notice of location, thereby put- 
ting their claims on record for purposes of FLPMA."247 
At the end of 1980, however, the appellees failed to timely meet 
their first annual obligation to file their report with the appropriate 
federal authority.248 Allegedly receiving misleading information from 
a BLM employee, appellees delayed until December 31 to file the 
annual notice of intent to hold, or proof of assessment work per- 
formed, as required by the Act.24e This filing was one day late.260 
Thereafter, the appellees were informed that their claims had been 
declared abandoned and void because of their late filing.261 After los- 
ing an administrative appeal, appellees sought relief in the Supreme 
Court, arguing that section 314 of the FLPMA262 "effected an un- 
constitutional taking of their property without just compensation and 
denied them due process of law."263 
Appellees' claims were rejected. The Court held that a statutory 
provision which terminates property rights upon an owner's failure to 
take the affirmative actions required by the statute does not take 
property.264 Even as to vested property rights, a legislature generally 
has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way in 
which those rights are used, or to condition their continued retention 
on performance of certain affirmative duties.a56 "As long as the con- 
straint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further 
legitimate legislative objectives, the legislature acts within its powers 
in imposing such new constraints or duties."26e In the Court's view, 
Congress' power to qualify existing property rights is particularly 




249. Id. at 89-90. 
250. Id. at 90. 
251. Id. 
252. 43 U.S.C. J 1744(c) (1976). 
253. Locke, 471 U.S. at 91-92. After their administrative appeal, the appellees first 
sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Id. at 91. Appel- 
lees claim was rejected in the District Court, whereupon they petitioned the Supreme Court. 
Id. 
254. Id. at 104 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525 (1982)). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
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claims-is a "unique form of property."267 Claimants take their min- 
eral interests with the knowledge that the government retains a sub- 
stantial power to qualify and redefine such interests. The legislative 
history supported the conclusion that the statute would extinguish 
those claims for which timely filings were not made, regardless of 
any evidence of intent to abandon.268 "[Tlhe failure to file on time, 
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost."269 
The Court went on to hold that filing one day late did not 
amount to substantial compliance with the Act. The Court stated: 
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by filing 
sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the least, a surpris- 
ing notion, and it is a notion without limiting principle. If 1-day 
late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be equally ac- 
ceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf 
the rule erected by the filing deadline; yet regardless of where the 
cutoff line is set, some individuals will always fall just on the other 
side of it . . . . A filing deadline cannot be complied with, substan- 
tially or otherwise, by filing late--even by one day.ae0 
Locke is important because the Court affirmed the power of the 
legislatures, state and federal, to go beyond mere regulation and to 
make definitional changes in property interests. In Locke, the gov- 
ernment redefined the mining claim from one which could be lost 
- 
only by the failure to produce minerals, to one which could be lost 
by the failure to perform additional administrative acts.2e1 Several 
257. Id. 
258. See id. at 94-96. 
259. Id. at 100; see also Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 628 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
260. Id. at 100-01. 
261. The Locke Court explained that the purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provi- 
sions to claims located before the Act was passed-"to rid federal lands of stale mining claims 
and to provide for centralized collection by federal land managers of comprehensive and upto- 
date information on the status of recorded but unpatented mining claims-are clearly legiti- 
mate." Id. at 105-06. Additionally, the statute 
is a reasonable, if severe, means of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of 
their claims those claimants who fail to file provides a powerful motivation to com- 
ply with the filing requirement, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance en- 
ables federal land managers to know with certainty and ease whether a claim is 
currently valid. 
Id. at  106. "[Tlhe restriction attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes 
the most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper once a year indicat- 
ing that the required assessment work has been performed or that they intend to hold the 
claim." Id. Accordingly, the possibility of the extinguishment of a vested property interest 
based upon rules not pertaining at the creation of the right established no constitutional 
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years earlier, in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,262 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a similar state statute. There, the Indiana min- 
eral lapse statute provided that a severed mineral interest not used 
for a period of twenty years would automatically lapse and revert to 
the current surface owner of the property.2a3 The lapse did not apply 
if the mineral owner had used the mineral interest or filed a state- 
ment of claim in the local recorder's Several forms of "use" 
of a mineral interest that were sufficient to preclude extinction of a 
claim "include[d] the actual or attempted production of minerals, 
the payment of rents or royalties, and any payment of taxes."2e6 Par- 
ties whose interests were extinguished under the statute maintained, 
among other things, that the statute effected a taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation.2es In rejecting the 
takings argument, the Court first noted the nature of the property 
interest in a severed mineral interest. The state had defined this es- 
tate as a " 'vested property interest,' entitled to 'the same protection 
as . . . fee simple titles.' "267 However, the Court explained, the state 
had declared that this property interest was one of less than absolute 
duration, unlike fee simple titles, with retention being conditioned on 
the fulfillment of at least one of the requirements of the Act.26e But 
this redefinition was not a taking. Rather; the Court explained, 
''[wle have no doubt that, just as a State may create a property 
interest that is entitled to constitutional protection, the State has the 
power to condition the permanent retention of that property right on 
the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present in- 
tention to retain the interest."26B 
The Court went on to find that the state had not exercised its 
legislative power in an arbitrary manner.270 Rather, the statute de- 
scribed specific actions which, if undertaken by an owner of a sev- 
claims. Id. at 107. 
262. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
263. Id. at 518. 
264. Id. at 518-19. 
265. Id. at 519. 
266. Id. at 522. These parties also argued that the self-executing aspect of the statute, 
i.e., that extinguishment would occur without prior notice of the imminence of the extinguish- 
ment, violated their procedural due process rights. Id. 
267. Id. at 525-26 (citation omitted). 
268. Id. at 526. 
269. Id. The Court stated that "[flrom an early time, this Court has recognized that 
States have the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to revert to another 
after the passage of time." Id. 
270. Id. at 529. 
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ered mineral estate, would avoid lapse.271 The specific actions added 
further legitimacy to the state's goals of encouraging owners of min- 
eral interests to develop the potential of those interests; promoting 
the state's fiscal interest in collecting property taxes; and "facilitat- 
ing the identification and location of mineral owners, from whom de- 
velopers may acquire operating rights and from whom the county 
could collect taxes."272 The Court concluded that "[tlhe State surely 
has the power to condition the ownership of property on compliance 
with conditions that impose such a slight burden on the owner while 
providing such clear benefits to the State."a7s 
Locke and Texaco affirmed the power of legislatures, both state 
and federal, to go beyond mere regulation and to make definitional 
changes in property interests, depending upon the nature of the prop- 
erty interest. This seems to be what Freyfogle argues should be done 
in the case of natural resources.274 In Freyfogle's view, the power of 
the legislature to reshape water law is derived from a consideration 
of the special and essential nature of water.a76 In Locke, Congress' 
power to redefine mining claims exists because of the unique nature 
of a mining claim, although the Supreme Court has never clearly 
explained in what way it is unique.276 Perhaps, as in Hallett Creek, 
it is unique because it involves private claims on exhaustible natural 
and public resources.a77 In Texaco, some form of reshaping or quali- 
fication that exposes a property owner to the possible loss of a vested 
property right in ways different from the common law is within the 
power of the government if the conditions imposed for continued 
ownership are reasonable - i.e., either because costs are not exces- 
sive or because the statute allows a reasonable opportunity to per- 
form the conditions in order to avoid loss of the property.278 
While these cases do not inform as to all possible derangement 
to the expectation that is permitted by law, the Court did venture to 
draw a line in a different context in a case involving a statute which 
27 1 .  See id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 529-30. The claimants' due process arguments were rejected under the logic 
of the Takings Clause. See id. at 531-38. 
274. See Freyfogle, supra note 231, at 1531. 
275. Id. at 1530-31. 
276. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (citation omitted). 
277. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988) (involving 
petition for statutory adjudication of water rights), cert. denied sub. nom. California v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). 
278. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982). 
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ostensibly redefined a property interest, but which had the effect of 
denying altogether a fundamental right otherwise inherent in that 
property interest.27e In Hodel v. Irving,280 at issue was the Indian 
Land Consolidation which provided for the escheat of small 
undivided property interests that were unproductive during the year 
preceding the owner's death.282 The Indian Land Consolidation Act 
was enacted to ameliorate the problem of fractionated ownership of 
279. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
280. Id. 
281. 25 U.S.C. $8 2201-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The Court in Hodel described the 
purpose of the Act as follows: 
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts which 
divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for 
Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation seems to 
have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic 
ways in order to "speed the Indians's assimilation into American society" and.in 
part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white settlement. 
Hodel, 481 U.S. a t  706 (citation omitted). 
282. Hodel, 481 U.S. at  709. As a background to the issues here, Congress adopted 
legislation in 1889 which authorized the 
[dlivision of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations 
and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, condi- 
tional on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux [under the Act of 
Mar. 2, 1889, Ch. 405, 25 Stat. 8881. Under [this legislation], each male Sioux 
head of household took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres. In 
order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white 
settlers, the Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were to be held 
in trust by the United States. Until 1910, the lands of deceased allottees passed to 
their heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where the land was 
located . . . and after 1910, allottees were permitted to dispose of their interests by 
will in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior [in 
order to protect Indian ownership]. 
Id. 706-07 (citations omitted). 
As Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion: 
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians. 
Cash generated by land sales to whites was quickly dissipated, and the Indians, 
rather than farming the lands themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their 
allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals. The 
failure of the allotment program became even clearer as successive generations 
came to hold the allotted lands. Thus, 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splin- 
tered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, 
and many parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land was held in trust and 
often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew 
over time. 
Id. at 707 (citation omitted). 
The administrative burdens in keeping track of ownership interests became all consuming. 
In response, Congress ended further allotment of Indian Lands by an act in 1934. However, 
"the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent the further compounding of the ex- 
isting problem caused by the passage of time[,] . . . [as] [olwnership continued to fragment 
[with the] succeeding generations [which] came to hold property." Id. at 708. 
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Indian Lands.28s Section 207 of that Act provided: 
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted 
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's 
jurisdiction shall descent [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall es- 
cheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less 
of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less 
than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to e~cheat.'~' 
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation to the 
owners of the interests covered by this section.286 
Appellees were members of the Sioux Tribe who were repre- 
sentatives, heirs or devisees of interests covered by section 207.28e 
They maintained that section 207 resulted in a taking of property 
without just c~mpensa t ion . '~~  The District Court held that the "stat- 
ute was constitutional . . . [and that] the appellees had no vested 
interest in the property of the decedents prior to their deaths, and 
that Congress had plenary authority to abolish the power of testa- 
mentary disposition of Indian property and to alter the rules of intes- 
tate succession."288 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. [While] it 
agreed that the appellees had no vested rights in the decedents' 
property, it concluded that their decedents had a right, derived 
from the original Sioux allotment statute, to control disposition of 
their property at death. The court held that the appellees had 
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right by 
[section 2071 without compensation . . . violated the Fifth 
Amendment.288 
In affirming this decision, the Court first concluded that Con- 
gress' "broad authority to regulate the descent and devise of Indian 
trust lands"2B0 is justified in order to address the problem of the frac- 
tionation of Indian lands.291 The Court also recognized that, in gen- 
eral, "the Government has considerable latitude in regulating prop- 
283. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, $ 207, 96 Stat. 2517, 2519 
(1983) (amended 1990). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 709. 
287. Id. at 710. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. (citation omitted). 
290. Id. at 712. 
291. Id. 
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erty rights in ways that may adversely affect the owners."2B2 The 
Court further noted that "[tlhe framework for [determining] 
whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking requiring just 
compensation [was] firmly established and [had] been regularly and 
recently reaffirmed."2es However, this framework required, among 
other things, a consideration of "the economic impact of the regula- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  In this case, "[tlhere [was] no question that the relative 
economic impact of section 207 upon the owners of these property 
rights [had the potential to] be substantial."2B6 Although the section 
provided for the escheat of small unproductive property interests, the 
economic impact was not lessened because of the nominal income of 
the property.2B6 When the total value of the property was consoli- 
dated its value was much greater, and there was "no question . . . 
that the right to pass on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a 
valuable right."2B7 Indeed, "[dlepending on the age of the owner, 
much or most of the value of the parcel may inhere in this 'remain- 
der' interest."2B8 
The Court found, however, that the extent to which any of the 
appellees' decedents had "investment-backed expectations" in pass- 
ing on the property was dubious.2es None of the appellees could iden- 
tify any specific expectations "beyond the fact that their ancestors 
agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to the United States 
large parts of the original Great Sioux R e s e r v a t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  In fact, the 
property had been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and 
was overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise.301 "Because 
of the highly fractionated ownership, the property [was] generally 
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners."302 Also 
weighing in favor of the validity of the statute, though weakly, was 
the fact that consolidation of land might benefit the Tribe, since 
owners of escheatable interests often benefit from the escheat of the 
others' fractional interests and, consolidated lands were more pro- 
Id. at 713. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Id. at 714 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). 
Id. 
See id. 
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ductive than fractionated lands.303 
The Hodel Court continued by noting that if it were to end the 
analysis at this point, it might well find that section 207 was consti- 
t u t i ~ n a l . ~ ~ '  However, it was necessary to consider the "extraordi- 
nary" character of the government regulation.306 The regulation 
amounted to a "virtual[] abrogation of the right to pass on a certain 
type of property - the small undivided interest - to one's heirs."30B 
As Justice O'Connor continued, 
In one form or another, the right to pass on property-to one's 
family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal 
system since feudal times. The fact that it might [have been] possi- 
ble for the owners of these interests to effectively control disposi- 
tion upon death through complex inter vivos transactions such as 
revocable trusts [was] simply not an adequate substitute for the 
rights taken, given the nature of the property. . . . Moreover, this 
statute effectively abolishe[d] both descent and devise of these 
property interests even when the passing of the property to the heir 
might result in consolidation of property-as for instance when the 
heir already owned another undivided interest in the property.s07 
Further, these rights of alienation were "abolished even in circum- 
stances when the governmental purpose sought to be advanced, con- 
solidation of ownership of Indian lands, did not conflict with the fur- 
ther descent of the property."308 
Given the seriousness of the problem of the fractional interests 
in the Indian lands, it would be unquestionably within Congress' 
power to enact corrective statutory provisions, such as by redefining 
this property interest by making it non-divisible on pain of escheat or 
non-descendibility thereby forcing the owners to formally designate 
an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe.s0B However, Congress could 
not redefine the interest with the result of the total elimination of 
one of the six traditional rights inhering in property-the right to 
alienate through devise or descent.310 
Id. 
Id. at 716. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Id. at 718. 
Id. 
See id.; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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B. Redejnition of Mining Rights in Earlier Legislation 
Consistent with Locke and Texaco, and in spite of Hodel, 
throughout the last century, Congress and governmental agencies 
have adopted laws and policies pertaining to mining activities on 
public land that have reshaped, redefined and curtailed the six rights 
traditionally inhering in pr~perty .~" The right to use property has 
been qualified by the Mining and Mineral Policy under 
which the Bureau of Land Management has promulgated regula- 
tions "to encourage the development of federal mineral resources 
and [the] reclamation of disturbed lands, . . . [and] to assure that 
operations include adequate and responsible measures to prevent un- 
necessary or undue degradation of the Federal lands and to provide 
for reasonable r e c l a m a t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  
The National Forest Management ActS1' ("NFMA") gives the 
Forest Service the responsibility of managing surface impacts from 
mining on federal forest lands and requires detailed land use man- 
agement plans before mining activities can continue. The Act speci- 
fies the contents of land use management plans and requires exten- 
sive public participation in connection with the formulation, 
amendment, or revision of any plans.s16 The right of excluding others 
31 1. See supra part V1.A. 
312. 30 U.S.C. 8 21(a) (1988). 
313. 43 C.F.R. 8 3809.0-6 (1992). The objectives of the regulations are to: 
(a) Provide for mineral entry, exploration, location, operations and purchase pursu- 
ant to the mining laws in a manner that will not unduly hinder such activities but 
will assure that these activities are conducted in a manner that will prevent unneces- 
sary or undue degradation and provide protection of non mineral resources of the 
Federal lands; 
(b) Provide for reclamation of disturbed areas; and 
(c) Coordinate, to the greatest extent possible with appropriate state agencies, pro- 
cedures for prevention of unnecessary or undue degradation with respect to mineral 
operations. 
43 C.F.R. 8 3809.0-2 (1992). 
314. 16 U.S.C. $8 1600-87 (1988). 
315. Id. The Forest Service Regulations, 36 C.F.R. $8 228.4, 228.8 (1992), adopted 
under the Forest Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. 88 475-82, 551 (1988), set forth the rules 
and procedures under which mining operations on the surface of National Forest Land are to 
be conducted so as to minimize any adverse environmental impact on surface resources. See 
Stanley Dempsey, Forest Service Regulations Concerning the Effect of Mining Operations on 
Service Resources. 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAWYER 481 (1975); Jerry L. Haggard, Regulation of 
Mining Law Activities on Federal Lands, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 349, 365-76 (1975); 
Randy L. Parcel, Federal, State and Local Regulation of Mining Exploration, 22 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 405 (1976). 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act every major federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the environment requires that a federal agency study and prepare a 
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has since been qualified and redefined by the Surface Resources and 
Multiple Use Act ("SRMUA") of 1955.31e Under this Act, the 
miner's right of excluding others and of processing minerals became 
subject to the right of the United States to manage and dispose of 
surface resources and to the right of the public to enjoy the sur- 
face.317 By enacting SRMUA, Congress intended to clarify the law 
and to address abuses that had occurred under the General Mining 
Law.318 The abuses included acts by persons locating mining claims 
"with no real intent to prospect or mine but rather to gain possession 
of the surface resources,"319 and acts by persons who might have had 
a "legitimate intent to utilize the claim for the development of the 
mineral content at the time of the location [but who] often did 
nOf,,320 engage in any significant mineral production efforts. These 
abusive claims had the effect of withdrawing areas of public domain 
from general public uses and of blocking public access to adjacent 
tracts, water needed for grazing purposes, and valuable recreational 
areas.321 In other cases, groups of fisherman-prospectors would locate 
detailed statement on the environmental impacts of that proposed action. 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(c) 
(1988). No environmental impact statement is required on an application for a patent. See 
South Dakota v .  Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980). 
316. 30 U.S.C. 5 612 (1989). 
317. Id. The Act provides inter olio: 
Rights under any mining claim hereinafter located under the mining laws of the 
United States shall be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of 
the United States to manage and dispose of the vegetative surface resources thereof 
and to manage other surface resources thereof. . . . Any such mining claims shall 
also be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of the United 
States, its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as may be 
necessary for such purposes or for access to adjacent land: Provided. however, That 
any use of the surface of any such mining claim by the United States, its permittees 
or licensees, shall be such as not to endanger or materially interfere with prospect- 
ing, mining or processing operations or uses reasonably incident thereto. 
Id. 8 612(b) (emphasis added). 
318. The purpose of [this legislation] is to permit multiple use of the surface re- 
sources of our public lands, to provide for their more efficient administration, and to 
amend the mining laws to curtail abuses of those laws by a few individuals who 
usually are not miners. At the same time, the measure faithfully safeguards all of 
the rights and interests of bona fide prospectors and mine operators. In no way 
would it deprive them of rights and means for development of the mineral resources 
of the public lands of the United States under the historic principles of free enter- 
prise and private ownership of the present mining laws. 
S. REP. NO. 554, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1955). 
319. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 61 1 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th. Cir. 1980). 
320. Id. 
321. Id. Recently, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") also reported that an exami- 
nation of 240 randomly selected claims showed that 239 were not being mined at the time of 
GAO visits, and that there was no evidence that any mineral extraction had ever taken place 
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a good stream, stake out successive mining claims flanking the 
stream and proceed to enjoy their own private fishing camps.3aa 
"Hunter-prospectors" would also block-out "mining claims" which 
embraced wildlife habitats.323 Under SRMUA, the claimant may 
mine to the extent that such activities do not unreasonably degrade 
surface resources and the claimant's right to exclude others extends 
only to other potential claimants as to the site of the actual mining 
operations, but no further, as "any member of the public is free to 
picnic on the claim, sleep on it, or watch tumbleweeds blow across 
it."324 
The right of excluding others under a mining claim has been 
further qualified by the Multiple Mineral Development Act of 
1954,326 which provides that the same tract of public land can be 
developed concurrently under the General Mining Law and the Min- 
eral Leasing This means that the United States can grant 
leases for mining of fuel minerals in the same land in which mining 
claimants explore for non-fuel minerals. 
Under the FLPMA, a miner may even be excluded from areas 
otherwise open to mineral exploration.3a7 A miner can be denied a 
right of access to a claim in order to "prevent.unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands."328 
Other laws enacted since 1872 limit the right of a claimant to 
destroy or injure the land in which a claim is located, although it is 
doubtful that this right ever inhered in the mining claim, since a 
on 237 claims. GAO REPORT NO. B-118678 (1989). The GAO estimated that no minerals had 
ever been extracted in 197,000 of the estimated 200,000 claims filed in ten counties in the four 
western states it studied. Id. In an examination of 93 randomly selected claims that had been 
patented, the GAO found that only seven were being mined, while 66 were put to no apparent 
use. Id. Twenty of the patented claims were being used for non-mining purposes, including 
resorts, junkyards, a shopping center and even a house of prostitution. Id.; see also LESHY, 
supra note 14, at 49-67. 
322. LESHY, supra note 14, a t  65-66. 
323. See id. at 66. 
324. United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 837 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Silbrico Corp. 
v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1989) (surface encroachment upon an unpatented lode 
mining claim did not impede the claim owner's mining operations); United States v. Curtis- 
Nevada Mines, Inc., 61 1 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1980) ("limit[ing] the exclusive possession 
of mining claimants so as to permit the multiple use of the surface resources of the claims 
prior to the patenting of the claims, so long as that use did not materially interfere with pros- 
pecting or mining operations"). 
325. 30 U.S.C. 8 521 (1988). 
326. Id. 
327. 43 U.S.C. 8 1732(b) (1988). 
328: Id.; see also 43 C.F.R. 8 3809.0-1 (1992). 
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mining claim gave only the right to possess for purposes of ex- 
tracting minerals, and did not give title to the land. As described 
earlier, under SRMUA,328 miners are prohibited from removing veg- 
etative resources from the area within the claims except to the .extent 
required for the claimant's mining operations. One court has inter- 
preted the provisions of SRMUA to give the government the power 
to decide the optimal and least destructive methods of mining, even 
if the methods chosen preclude fruitful mining or result in substan- 
tially greater burdens to the claimant. In United States v. Richard- 
son,330 the mining claim holders filed notices of location for six min- 
ing claims in the Wind River Ranger District, in the Gifford Pinchot 
National Forest in the State of W a s h i n g t ~ n . ~ ~ ~  "The claims were sit- 
uated at the confluence of Slide Creek and the East Fork of the 
Lewis River, an area reforested after a destructive fire some forty 
years ago."332 The miners explored and prospected their claims by 
use of heavy equipment and by blasting.333 Approximately 1.6 acres 
of land were affected by the surface disturbance created by bulldoz- 
ing of three separate acres.39J "From the early days of these activi- 
ties, forest rangers remonstrated with the miners respecting the ex- 
cessive and unnecessary surface and environmental damage caused 
by their methods of prospecting and suggested core drilling as an 
a l t e r n a t i ~ e . " ~ ~ ~  However, the miners did not heed to these sugges- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  "Ultimately [an] action was filed to enjoin further blasting 
and bulldozing and to restore surface damage."337 
The miners had expended approximately $40,000 in developing 
the mine.338 They maintained that they used methods best-suited for 
the purpose of removing the overburden and for uncovering the ore 
body.33B Because the mineral prospect was, at best, a low grade cop- 
per deposit, it was essential to determine that a large body of ore for 
commercially feasible mining existed.340 The report written by the 
government's expert geologist justified continued exploration and 
See supra notes 316-25 and accompanying text. 
599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979). 







Id. at 291. 
Id. 
Id. 
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found that "[tlhe only acceptable initial approach to exploration of 
the type [of] deposit [at issue] would be core drilling after perform- 
ance of all applicable surface geotechnical surveys."341 Nonetheless, 
the District Court rendered judgment for the government, holding 
that the "[sltripping away [of] over burden to expose rockbed, par- 
ticularly in the initial exploration stages, [was] not proper mining 
procedure, under the circumstances of [the] case."34a Instead, the 
mining techniques employed, blasting and bulldozing, were destruc- 
tive to the surface resources and, therefore, were an unreasonable 
method of exposing subsurface deposits.343 Accordingly, the court 
held that the Forest Service could require the use of only 
nondestructive methods of prospe~t ing.~"~ 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the SRMUA speaks of 
" 'the right of the United States to manage and dispose of the vege- 
tative resources thereof and to manage other surface resources 
thereof.' It limits such control so 'as not to [elndanger or 
[mlaterially interfere with prospecting, mining . . . or uses 
[rleasonably incident thereto."'346 " It also . . . precludes the ex- 
ploitation of surface resources by a locator 'except to the extent 
[rlequired for . . . prospecting, mining . . . and uses [rleasonably 
incident thereto.' "346 In light of these provisions, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the District Court's findings reflected a correct interpreta- 





345. Id. at 295. 
346. Id. 
347. Id; see also United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1989). In Doremus, 
the claimants maintained that the Forest Service Regulations did not apply to their mining 
operations. Id. at 631. The regulations required all miners to submit an operating plan before 
commencing mining operations. Id. The plan at issue provided that " 'the area[s] of explora- 
tion would be concentrated to the clear cut, and that no more than five trenches would be open 
at any one time.' " Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. 8 261.10(k) (1987)). Furthermore, the plan pro- 
vided that the cutting of live, green trees for firewood would be prohibited, and that " 'if 
timber is needed [the] operator is asked to cut small dead timber.'" Id. The plan neither 
expressly authorized, nor expressly prohibited, the removal of live trees to be used in the min- 
ing operation. Id. On several occasions, the Forest Service representatives visited the site and 
observed multiple open trenches, many of substantial size, crisscrossing more than 1.25 acres, 
trees that had been pushed over "and a road that had been constructed through the trees on 
one side of the claim." Id. 
Claimants maintained that their operations were exempt from the regulations by the pro- 
viso which states: "[nlothing in this part shall preclude activities as authorized by . . . the U.S. 
Mining Laws Act of 1872 as amended." Id. at  632 (citing 36 C.F.R. 5 261.l(b) (1992)). The 
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Uses that are otherwise injurious to the environment are prohib- 
ited by the Mining in the Parks This statute was enacted in 
1976 to eliminate most national park areas from mineral exploration 
and devel~prnent,~'~ leaving open six national areas for mineral de- 
velopment: Crater Lake National Park, Mount McKinley National 
Park, Coronado National Memorial, Organ Pipe Cactus National 
Monument, Death Valley National Monument, and Glacier Bay Na- 
tional Monument.s6o But Congress declared that, 
all mining operations in areas of the National Park System should 
be conducted so as to prevent or minimize damage to the environ- 
ment and other resource values, and, in certain areas of the Na- 
tional Park System, surface disturbance from mineral development 
should be temporarily halted while Congress determines whether or 
not to acquire any valid mineral rights which may exist in such 
. 
Since enactment of this act, the National Park Service ("NPS") 
has reported to the General Accounting Office ("GAO") that their 
regulations prevent unnecessary surface disturbance and minimize 
court pointed out that the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955, which amended 
the general mining law, resewed to the United States the right to manage and dispose of 
surface resources on unpatented mining claims and prohibited the removal of vegetative sur- 
face resources "[elxcept to the extent required for the mining claimant's prospecting, mining 
or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto . . . or to provide clearance for 
such operations or uses." Id. (citing Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act, 30 U.S.C. 
5 612(c) (1988)). In this respect, the regulations were not inconsistent with the mining law 
and claimants activities therefore were not exempt from the regulations. Id. 
348. Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. 55 1901-1912 (1988). Section 1902 provides 
in pertinent part: 
[all1 activities resulting from the exercise of valid existing mineral rights on pat- 
ented or unpatented mining claims within any area of the National Park System 
shall be subject to such regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior as he 
deems necessary or desirable for the preservation and management of those areas. 
Similar laws have been enacted to assess the environmental harm posed by coal mining. 
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, regulates coal mining on non- 
federal lands. 30 U.S.C. $8 1201-1328 (1988). The Act "embodies Congress' recognition that 
the expansion of coal mining to meet the Nation's energy needs makes even more urgent the 
establishment of appropriate standards to minimize damage to the environment and to the 
productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of the public." In re Permanent 
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the Act 
gave the Secretary rule-making power to prescribe minimum information requirements for 
permit applications submitted to state regulatory agencies). 
349. 16 U.S.C. 5 1901. 
350. H.R. REP. NO. 1428. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2487, 2492-93. 
351. 16 U.S.C. 5 1901(b). 
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adverse environmental effects.362 For example, in Death Valley Na- 
tional Monument, the area with the most mining activity, very little 
surface disturbance has occurred since 1976, while mineral produc- 
tion has increa~ed.~" All mining operations within the National Park 
System are subject to NPS regulations which require that each min- 
ing operator develop a plan of operation in cooperation with the 
NPS.36The regulations describe the constraints under which miners 
must operate, including those relating to the potential effects of min- 
ing on air and water quality, on any endangered or threatened plant 
or animal.species, and on natural and historic landmarks.366 The 
plan must also include a reclamation plan "to ensure that the land is 
returned as nearly as possible to original contours when the mine is 
c l o ~ e d . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
The Mining in the Parks Act has been interpreted to prohibit 
the operation of heavy, off-road vehicles in Alaska's Yukon-Charley 
Rivers National Preserve without first obtaining an access permit.367 
The Tenth Circuit has held that permits may be required to prevent 
the unreasonable degradation of a wilderness study area, even if ac- 
cess to the area could not be totally denied.368 
353. Id. at 30. 
354. Id. at 31. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). "The Yukon-Charley 
Rivers National Preserve was created and made a part of the National Park System by the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 5 410hh(10) [(1988)]." Id. at 
639. Vogler was a placer miner who owned "between 50 and 150 patented and unpatented 
mining claims." Id. at  640. He operated a Caterpillar and a multi-ton transport vehicle along 
what is "commonly called the Bielenberg trail." Id. Vogler maintained "that the marshy con- 
dition of the trail in the summer made it necessary to travel with the caterpillar alongside the 
transport vehicle, off the trail. He acknowledged that this process 'raises cain' with the trail." 
Id. He stated "that when he came to streams or creeks, he cut bunches of poles and trees, 
making a 'bridge' so he could cross." Id. Experts testified about "uprooted trees, areas where 
all the vegetation had been scraped away, and a strip about six feet wide along the side of the 
trail where vegetation had been flattened by Vogler's Caterpillar. One expert noted that some 
of the areas could require up to 100 years to return to their original condition." Id. 
The Court found "that compliance with the Park Service's permit regulations is essential 
to ensuring the protection of the Preserve's natural beauty and value." Id. at 641. The "regula- 
tions are designed to 'conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife 
therein and to . . . leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."' Id. (quot- 
ing 16 U.S.C. 8 1). 
358. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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The Wilderness Act of 1964,369 which formally established the 
National Wilderness Preservation System, withdrew wilderness lands 
from mineral development, although preserving valid existing 
rights.s60 The Act required periodic surveys of the mineral values in 
wilderness areas by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, limited mining law 
patents in wilderness areas to the minerals only (subject to "valid 
existing rights"), and gave the Department of the Interior the au- 
thority to regulate mineral activity in the wilderness for the protec- 
tion of the wilderness' character as "consistent with the use of the 
land for mineral location and development and exploration, drilling 
and prod~ction."~~'  
VII. EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED MINERAL EXPLORATION A D 
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1993362 
While the concept that the legislature holds the power to qualify 
or redefine existing property rights, especially those created by stat- 
ute, seems firmly established as discussed in Locke, Texaco, and Ho- 
del, these cases also admit that the power of Congress is not limit- 
less.369 Instead, a redefinition that "goes too far" may be a taking, 
entitling the property owner to just compensation. However, as dis- 
cussed earlier, the monuments for determining when this point is 
reached seem more apparent than real.364 
A. Holding Fee, Royalty, and Duration of Claim 
The proposed Act assesses a fee per acre (starting at five dol- 
lars) on all mining claims, and charges royalties on minerals ex- 
tracted starting at eight percent.866 Currently, a claimant pays noth- 
359. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1988). 
360. The Act by its terms was to be applied prospectively to mineral leasing, becoming 
effective on January 1, 1984. Id. 1 133(d)(3). 
361. Id. For example, with respect to access to mining claims, the regulations provide: 
Persons with valid mining claims wholly within National Forest Wilderness shall be 
permitted access to such surrounded claims by means consistent with the preserva- 
tion of National Forest Wilderness which have been or are being customarily used 
with respect to other such claims surrounded by National Forest Wilderness. The 
Forest Service will, when appropriate, issue permits which shall prescribe the routes 
of travel to and from the surrounded claims or occupancies, the mode of travel, and 
other conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the National Forest Wilderness. 
36 C.F.R. 228.15(c), 293.13 (1992). 
362. H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
363. See supra part V.A. 
364. See supra part V.A. 
365. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
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ing for his claim or the minerals extracted, but, in order to obtain a 
patent, he must demonstrate that he has expended at least $100 per 
year in labor or improvements or a total of $500 on the claim.sBe The 
proposed assessment would apply to existing as well as to future 
claims.s67 A property interest, which at its creation entitled the 
owner to the complete enjoyment of the fruits and profits, is being 
redefined as one in which the fruits and profits must be shared. How- 
ever, the effect of the proposed redefinition may be viewed not as 
denying the claimant any fundamental rights inhering in the prop- 
erty, but as a form of user or impact feesB8 since, under the proposed 
legislation, all fees and royalties derived from mining operations are 
to be held in a fund for the purpose of assuring clean-up and preser- 
v a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  There is an apparent rational relationship between the as- 
sessment of a fee and the costs of the benefits conferred or harmful 
effects of mining activities. Numerous reports and studies show 
harmful environmental effects from hardrock mining.s70 The only is- 
sue may lie in the amount of the fee, whether it is purely arbitrary 
or founded upon some scientific estimates. 
Under the current rules, a mining claim arises upon the discov- 
ery of a "valuable mineral deposit" which is defined as one for which 
a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further ex- 
penditure of his labor and means with a reasonable prospect of suc- 
cess in developing a mine.s71 To preserve the claim, a claimant need 
only expend $100 worth of labor or improvements per year.s72 The 
claim otherwise continues so long as it is mined.s7s Under the pro- 
posed legislation, a claimant must, in addition, actually produce ore 
366. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
367. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. 
369. section 104 of the proposed legislation provides for the distribution of receipts: 
[Rleceipts from royalties . . . shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States. 
Twenty five percent thereof shall be paid . . . to the State within the boundaries of 
which the locatable mineral deposits are or were located, 25 percent shall be depos- 
ited in the Hardrock Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, . . . 25 percent shall be 
deposited into the Hardrock Mining Impact Assistance Trust Fund, . . . and 25% 
thereof shall be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the Treasury. Upon termina- 
tion of Abandoned Reclamation Fund, 33 percent of such royalties shall be paid [by 
the Secretary of the Treasury to the States], 33 percent shall be deposited in the 
Hardrock Impact Assistance Trust Fund . . . , and 34 percent shall- be deposited as 
miscellaneous receipts in the Treasury. 
370. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
371. E.g.. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963). 
372. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
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in paying or commercial quantities within twenty years, or else the 
claim is deemed abandoned. These provisions make no allowance for 
the difficult, although promising, mining claim. If the twenty year 
period does not reflect the actual experience of miners and may be 
extinguished without regard to any variables, the provision may not 
meet the test under Locke and Texaco that the extinguishment not 
be arbitrary and the conditions for continued ownership not be 
~nreasonable .~~ '  
B. Withdrawal of Opportunity to Patent 
Under the proposed legislation, all mining claims, including 
those existing at the effective date of the Act, will remain mere 
claims with the right to mine, but without the right to exclude the 
public or the government from the area in which the claim is lo- 
~ a t e d . ~ ~ ~  Thus, a mining claim has been redefined as a property in- 
terest more akin to a servitude, which gives the right to possess, but 
which cannot lead to the acquisition of title.376 Congress' objective in 
this is quite clear-by withdrawing the opportunity to patent, claim- 
ants will be forced to abandon the lands once the claims have been 
exhausted or they are unable to produce commercial quantities of 
ore. The repeal of the patent provisions of the mining law by the 
proposed legislation is not the first direct attempt by Congress to 
limit fee titles in public lands stemming from mining claims. Almost 
from the time of passage of the General Mining Law, the govern- 
ment has withdrawn particular lands from mineral exploration in or- 
der to protect federal interests, such as the integrity of military in- 
stallations, Indian reservations, wildlife and other environmental 
374. See supra part V1.A. 
375. See H.R. 322, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 102 (1993). 
376. See id.  
377. See MICHAEL BEAN. THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 119-25 (cited 
in LESHY, supra note 14, a t  31). By approximately 1910, several million acres had been with- 
drawn and closed to mining. LESHY. supra note 14, at 31. The first withdrawals were accom- 
plished by executive order, rather than legislative act. Id. The executive's power to withdraw 
lands was challenged and decided in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
The Supreme Court found that the "rules or laws for the disposal of public land are necessa- 
rily general in their nature [such that] conditions may so change as to require [land to be 
withheld] in the public interest." Id. at  474. In this case, the Court found that Congress had 
given the power to withhold lands to the executive branch by implication. Id. By 1919, about 
50 million acres had been withdrawn; 40 million of which were coal lands; nearly 7 million 
were oil lands; almost all of the remaining acres were phosphate lands. See 58 CONG. REC. 
4784 (1919) (statement of Sen. Walsh). On other occasions in mining law history, Congress 
has withdrawn areas or substances from the privileges offered by the 1872 mining law. Under 
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The questions concerning withdrawal of public lands and the 
opportunity to obtain a patent (based upon claims existing at  the 
time of passage of the Sawtooth Act) were raised, but not settled, in 
Freese v. United States.378 There, the plaintiff owned five unpatented 
mining claims located on federal land.378 In 1972, Congress incorpo- 
rated these lands into the newly established Sawtooth National Rec- 
reation Area.S80 Like the proposed Mineral Exploration and Devel- 
opment Act of 1993, the Sawtooth Act expressly terminated the 
ability of existing claimholders to obtain a patent to lands in which 
the claims were located.381 The plaintiff maintained that denial of 
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, lands previously open to location and patent became availa- 
ble solely on a lease basis. 30 U.S.C. 8 193 (1992). However, previously located valid claims 
which were in existence on February 25, 1920 were protected and the Act allowed such claims 
to continue to qualify for patents so long as they are "maintained in compliance with the laws 
under which initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery." 
Id. The Act enacted in 1920 removed deposits of oil, gas, coal, phosphate, and sodium from 
the general mining law and added them to the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. The Materials Act in 
1947, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell materials including, but not limited to, 
sand, stone, gravel, yucca, manzanita, mesquite, cactus, common clay, and timber or other 
forest products, on public lands of the United States. 30 U.S.C. 8 601 (1992). By amendment 
in 1955, "common varieties" of stone, sand, gravel, cinder and pumice were removed from the 
general mining law and made subject to purchase only. Id. 8 61 1. In 1960, various asphalt 
deposits were removed from the general mining law and added to the Mineral Leasing Act. Id. 
8 181. 
Under the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1977, Congress declared certain 
lands to be unsuitable for mining, including: lands within the National Park or National Wild- 
life Refuge systems, federal lands within a national forest, areas in which mining might ad- 
versely affect a designated historic site, or within 300 feet of occupied dwellings, public 
schools, or churches. 30 U.S.C. 8 1272 (1992). Congress, however, limited the application of 
the surface mining proscriptions to avoid infringement of existing property rights. Id. The Act 
provided: "After [the enactment of this Act], and subject to valid existing rights no surface 
coal mining operations except those which exist on [the date of enactment of this Act] shall be 
permitted. . . ." Id. 8 1272(e). 
In 1974, Congress gave recognition to the public interest by protecting the wilderness 
through the Wilderness Act of 1974, which prohibited large' regions from becoming new min- 
ing claims after 1983 and imposed restrictions on the occupancy and use of pre-existing mining 
claims. See 16 U.S.C. 5 1131 (1985). The National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 pro- 
vided for an absolute prohibition against dredge or placer mining "within the banks or beds of 
the main stem of the St. Joe [River] and its tributary streams in their entirety above the 
confluence of the main stem with the North Fork of the river." 16 U.S.C. 8 1274(a)(23) 
(1992). The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 
8 410hh-5 (1988), formally withdrew federal lands in Alaska from all forms of mineral activ- 
ity. Finally, the Sawtooth Act, discussed in Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. CI 
1981). withdrew the right to patent in withdrawn national park land. 16 U.S.C. 8 460aa to 
460aa-14 (1988). 
378. 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. CI. 1981). 
379. Id. 
380. 16 U.S.C. 8 460aa (1992). 
381. The Act provided that, "[slubject to valid existing rights, all Federal lands located 
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the ability to obtain patents upon the five unpatented mining claims 
which plaintiff held on the effective date of the Act amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking of property.382 The plaintiff argued that a 
"vested right to a patent" arose upon discovery and location of a 
mining claim.388 The plaintiff meant that this "vested right" to pat- 
ent was a property interest, as much as a mining claim or a fee sim- 
ple title. The court rejected the plaintiffs takings argument, explain- 
ing that a vested right to the issuance of a patent "does not arise 
until there has been full compliance with the extensive procedures 
set forth in the federal mining laws."384 Since the "plaintiff had not 
yet taken the first step towards obtaining patents" before the passage 
of the Act, no private property had been taken.386 
The holding in Freese is logical and flawless as to the issue it 
. addressed. However, the issue the court addressed was clearly not 
the one raised by the plaintiff. The court ruled on the right to the 
issuance of written evidence of title (the patent) upon completion of 
an application. The plaintiff argued for a right to submit an applica- 
tion for a patent.386 The court ruled correctly that only a completed 
application entitles a mining claimant to a patent, but it did not ap- 
pear to grasp the gist of the plaintiffs theory, that is, the opportunity 
to file an application for a patent is a property interest protected by 
the Fifth Amendment. In any event, the issues in Freese could not be 
decided solely by reference to Wilbur v. United States ex rel. 
K r ~ s h n i c . ~ ~ '  There, as discussed earlier,38e notwithstanding the with- 
drawal of certain minerals from exploration by the Mineral Leasing 
Act, the holder of a claim covering the withdrawn minerals existing 
at the time of enactment of the statute was entitled to a patent upon 
application by virtue of a clause saving existing mining claims from 
e x t i n g u i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~ ~  To the extent that the language of the savings 
clause under the Sawtooth Act in Freese is similar to that in Wilbur 
in the recreation area are hereby withdrawn from all forms of location, entry, and patent 
under the mining laws of the United States." 16 U.S.C. 3 460aa-9 (1992). The Act further 
provided that "[platents shall not hereinafter be issued for locations and claims heretofore 
made in the recreation area under the mining laws of the United States." Id. 3 460aa-11. 
382. Freese, 639 F.2d at 757. 
383. Id. at 758. . 
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. at 755. 
387. 280 U.S. 306 (1930). 
388. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. 
389. Wilbur v.  United States ex. re/. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 314 (1930). 
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(as well as in Seldovia Native Ass'n v. L~jan),~@O an existing mining 
claim should be interpreted to give the claimant the right to file an 
application for a patent and the right to the issuance of a patent 
upon completion of the a p p l i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  But the withdrawal provisions 
of the Sawtooth Act in Freese go further than those in the Mineral 
Leasing Act in Wilbur and the ANCSA in Seldovia. The Sawtooth 
Act, by express terms, extinguished the inchoate right to patent, 
even as to claims preserved by the savings clause.39a This is precisely 
the effect of the proposed legislation. While one might conclude that 
Wilbur implicitly held that a right to apply for a patent inheres in a 
mining claim, the question whether extinguishment of this right (in 
the same way that denying a fee owner the right to possess the prop- 
erty) so interferes with the claimant's expectations as to effect a tak- 
ing was not before the Court.SBS 
390. 904 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). 
391. The Supreme Court's dicta in Stockley v. United States would seem to support a 
conclusion that in the absence of a savings clause, a non-vested interest in government largess 
could be withdrawn at  Congress' will. See Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 536 
(1923). 
392. 16 U.S.C. 8 460aa-11. 
393. Compare Clawson v. United States, 24 CI. Ct. 366 (1991). The plaintiff argued 
that a taking occurs when the government removes the opportunity to patent by withdrawing 
lands from public exploration. Id. at 369. At issue was the Central Idaho Wilderness Act 
("CIWA"), 16 U.S.C. 8 1274(a)(24), enacted in 1980, which incorporated various sections of 
the Salmon River in Idaho into the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. The Forest 
Service of the Department of Agriculture determined that under the Act, mining near tributa- 
ries of the Salmon River could take place only outside of their "perceptible banks above ordi- 
nary high water." Id. at 368. In 1981, Clawson "staked out a placer mining claim adjacent to 
Silver Creek, a tributary of the Salmon River." Id. To proceed with mining activities on his 
claim, Clawson submitted a plan of operations to the Forest Service. Id. The Forest Service 
commenced a study to assess the environmental risks of the proposed mining operation and 
concluded that subject to minor modifications, the plan "would not have a significant adverse 
effect on the environment." Id. But before Clawson could commence operations, the Idaho 
Environmental Council and the State of Idaho brought suit to enjoin him from proceeding and 
to force the Forest Service to rescind its approval of the mining plan. Id. The petitioners 
maintained that the CIWA prohibited all placer and dredge mining within the watershed of 
any tributary to the Middle Fork of the Salmon River, rather than just inside the perceptible 
banks of these tributaries below their ordinary high water marks. Id. 
The District Court held for the environmental group, ruling that "the Central Idaho Wil- 
derness Act of 1980 prohibited as of the effective date of [the] Act dredge and placer mining 
in any form within the watershed and drainage area of the Middle Fork of the Salmon River 
and all of its tributaries." Id. at  369. Because the claim was clearly within the watershed of 
Silver Creek, a tributary of the Salmon River, the court required the forest service to rescind 
its approval of plaintiffs mining operation located in the same area. Id. Clawson did not a p  
peal this ruling, but filed suit alleging among other things a taking of his claim without just 
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The wurt easily rejected Clawson's 
complaint on the ground that he never acquired any property interest in the land or to the 
minerals in place because the mining claim was not established until after the lands had been 
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Even assuming that the opportunity to obtain a patent is prop- 
erty, one must consider the extent of constitutional protection due. Is 
it an interest in government largess, like welfare benefits, which can 
be withdrawn, but only after the recipient has been given notice of 
the impending withdrawal and an opportunity to be heard on the 
issue? Or, is it a more substantial interest, the withdrawal of which 
requires compensation? If it is the latter, that is, an aspect of a right 
inhering in the mining claim, or a property interest which vests upon 
the discovery of valuable mineral deposits (the opportunity thereby 
losing its character as a mere expectation in the continued availabil- 
ity of government largess), then substantive rights are at  issue. 
C .  Permissible Uses 
On its face, the proposed Act does not regulate mining claims to 
the point of leaving no economically viable use, although this fact 
can only be determined by an examination of the costs of the recla- 
mation requirements in relation to particular mining activities.gs4 
withdrawn by the CIWA. Id; see also Fixel v. United States, 26 F.2d 353 (CI. Ct. 1992) 
(mining claims acquired after passage of CIWA). 
394. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In 
Whitney, the court held that the operation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act ("SMCRA"), which prohibited surface mining of alluvial valley floors, constituted a tak- 
ing of the coal property where the property had only one use and that use was prohibited by 
the Act. Id. 
The Court of Claims addressed the same issue in Ainsley v. United States, 8 CI. Ct. 394 
(1985). There, the plaintiff alleged that a combination of two acts of Congress resulted in a 
taking of her property without just compensation. Id. at  395. In 1978, Congress authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior to establish the Friendship Hill National Historic Site. Id. The site 
would be a part of the National Park System. Id. 
The Act also appropriated the necessary funds to acquire the property for the park. 
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary acquired certain properties on December 27, 
1979, including the surface property which overlies plaintiffs coal property. [Ac- 
cordingly, tlhis property was made a part of the Friendship Hill National Historic 
Site. 
As a result of [the] defendant's purchase of the land overlying the plaintiffs 
coal property, and the placement of that land in the Friendship Hill National His- 
toric Site, [the] plaintiff contend[ed] that her coal property [was] within the bound- 
aries of the National Park System. As such, [the] coal property [was] subject to the 
prohibition on surface coal mining operations set out in the [Surface Mining] Act. 
At the time of the passage of the Surface Mining Act and the creation of the 
Friendship Hill Historic Site, [the] plaintiff maintained that neither any coal mining 
operations existed on her property nor had she applied for or obtained a permit for 
mining coal. 
Id. at 396-97. The plaintiff maintained that the mining of coal on her land was the only 
beneficial use for her coal property. Id. at 397. She alleged that the Acts reduced the value of 
her land to zero, which constituted a taking without just compensation. Id. 
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the 
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While the requirement that money be spent is not, in and of itself, a 
taking of property, the result may be different where the expendi- 
tures exceed the value of the property.3e6 That issue, as it related to 
the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978,s98 was 
addressed in Atlas Corp. v. United States.Se7 In Atlas, "the plaintiffs 
sought recovery of costs associated with the stabilization of mill tail- 
ings that were generated from the uranium and thorium production 
under the completed contracts with the government."se8 The court 
dismissed the contract claim, finding no contractual agreement as to 
the matters at issue.3ee The plaintiffs also argued that the statute's 
requirement of spending large sums of money for reclamation and 
decommissioning of the tailings and its mill upon termination of its 
license was a taking.'OO 
The court found that plaintiffs had "not alleged a physical tak- 
ing of any of its property" inasmuch as the government action did 
not invade or permanently appropriate the plaintiffs property for 
public use and that "[rlequiring money to be spent is not a taking of 
property."401 Nor was there a regulatory taking.'02 The Act served 
ground that there was a definite question of fact, the resolution of which might entitle the 
plaintiff to the relief she requested. Id. One of those questions was whether the exceptions 
under 30 U.S.C. 5 1272(e) applied. Id. The exceptions included the existence of mining opera- 
tions on the site on August 3, 1977, and/or the establishment of valid existing rights to mine 
her property. Id. at 398. Although plaintiff admitted that her property had never been mined, 
the court noted that the definition of "valid existing rights" is not cut and dried and thus 
plaintiff might possibly have had such rights. Id. at 400. 
The court noted that the 1983 definition of "valid existing rights" appeared to be broader 
than the 1979 version and that the definition was evolving. Id. at 398. As such, the court 
believed that the agency should be given the opportunity in the first instance to apply the 
proper regulatory provision in determining the plaintiffs right to mine. Id. Thus, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs taking claim could not be resolved until an administrative deci- 
sion was reached regarding her "valid existing rights" and rights to mine her property. Id. at 
400. These points led the court to consider the second basis for the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, i.e., that the claim was not ripe for judicial resolution because the plaintiff had failed 
to exhaust her administrative remedies (to request a variance or waiver) set out in the Act and 
regulations. Id. at 402. The court concluded that the plaintiff should have initially sought an 
agency determination. Id. at 403. 
395. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989). 
396. Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (codified as amended in scattered section of 42 
U.S.C. The Act provided that the federal government had the responsibility for the stabiliza- 
tion and decommissioning of mill sites and required that operators of mills conduct their busi- 
ness in a manner that would not expose the public to harm. See 42 U.S.C. 5 2022 (1988). 
397. 895 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cerr. denied, 498 U.S. 81 1 (1990). 
398. Id. at 748-49. 
399. Id. at 749. 
400. Id. at 756. 
401. Id. ' 
402. Id. 
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to safeguard "the public against potential hazards of tailings radia- 
tion and radon gas emissions by requiring the owners and operators 
of uranium mills to stabilize the tailings and mill site to minimize 
the health hazards."403 While the costs would mean that the plain- 
tiffs would be deprived of the use of large amounts of money, they 
had failed to allege that the costs exceeded the value of the mill.'04 
They also did not claim that the government had interfered with 
their production of uranium or that the government had made use of 
their mills unpr~fitable. '~~ Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to show any 
interference with their investment-backed expectations because, from 
the outset of the uranium procurement program, in light of the regu- 
lation of the nuclear industry, the plaintiffs should have expected 
that the legislative scheme would be "buttressed by subsequent 
amendments to achieve the legislative end."40e 
In the hardrock mining context, claimants have argued unsuc- 
cessfully that the application of certain environmental laws to min- 
ing activities have effected a taking of property. For example, in 
Rybacheck v. United States,'07 the plaintiffs, owners and operators 
of a gold placer mine, sought recovery from the government for dep- 
rivation of property consisting of 255 acres of patented claims and 
twenty-one unpatented mining claims.408 The plaintiffs contended 
that the limitations and conditions on discharges imposed by the En- 
vironmental Protection Act and the Clean Water Act forced them to 
curtail the hydraulic removal of overburden and made mining the 
property unpr~fitable. '~~ They argued that mining was the only eco- 
nomically viable use of their land, that the land could be successfully 
mined only by means of hydraulic removal of overburden, and that 
the cost of mining under the permit restrictions far exceeded the 
value of any gold extracted.'1° The government asserted that the 
plaintiffs were not deprived of economically viable use of their prop- 
erty.'ll The government reasoned that the plaintiffs had, in fact, 
mined their land continuously, admitted only to losing their subsur- 
403. Id. at 757 (citing 42 U.S.C. 8 7901). 
404. Id. at 758. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. 
407. 23 CI. Ct. 222 (1991). 
408. Id. at 223. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. 
41 1. Id. at 224. 
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face rights, and had retained their water rights.412 
The court applied the three-factor regulatory takings test.41s 
First, with respect to the character of the government action, the 
court inquired "whether the government act closely parallele[d] an 
act of eminent domain. . . . [with t]he central question [being] 
whether the act [was] equivalent to the physical invasion of substan- 
tial rights held in the property.""' "These rights include the right to 
possess, use, and dispose of the property, as well as the right to ex- 
clude others."416 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that they were 
deprived of a substantial use of their property.41B "However, [be- 
cause] their rights to possess, dispose, and exclude others [were] not 
directly affected[,] . . . the character of the government action . . . 
[was] not equivalent to the physical destruction or intrusion of an 
act of eminent d~main.""~ "This factor, as a matter of law, weighed 
against finding a taking of the plaintiffs' land."418 
"The second and third factors, the economic impact of the regu- 
lation and interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta- 
tions, involve a comparison of the property before and after the regu- 
lation's alleged interference including a comparison of property 
value."419 The court stated that "[tlhe concern in our case is 
whether the plaintiffs' right to mine gold could be 'exercised with 
profit,"'420 though the mere diminution in property value, as opposed 
to the destruction of economically viable use, would not constitute a 
regulatory taking.421 The court left open the possible showing by de- 
fendant that the land was useful for purposes other than mining, 
such as recreational However, if the only viable defense 
identified by the court (namely, the ability of the plaintiffs to use the 
land for recreational purposes), is removed because mining claims 
can be used for mining purposes only, then the provision of the pro- 
posed legislation which impose financial costs greater that the value 
of any ore extracted, may be a taking.42s 
412. Id. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381, 391 (1988)). 
415. Id. at 224-25 (quoting Loveladies, 15 CI. Ct. at 391). 
416. Id. at 225. 
417. Id. (citing Loveladies, 15 CI. Ct. at 391). 
418. Id. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. (citation omitted). 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 225-26. 
423. Id; see Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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Furthermore, regarding the subsurface and surface rights, the 
court held that it did not follow that the plaintiffs "were not de- 
prived of economically viable use of their property because they al- 
lege[d] that the permit restrictions interfered with only their subsur- 
face rights."424 Instead, the court must consider the value of the 
plaintiffs' property as a whole in measuring both the severity of the 
regulation's impact and interference with reasonable investment- 
backed expectations.426 
D. Deference to  the Legislature 
Using the most recent Supreme Court regulatory takings case 
as the central focus, Professor John R. Nolon attempts to offer some 
analytic precision to the regulatory takings cases.42B He argues that 
all regulatory takings cases fit into one of four factual contexts: 1) 
"public values," where regulations such as historic preservation ordi- 
424. Rybacheck, 23 CI. Ct. a t  225 (citing Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 
Cl. Ct. 394, 405 (1989), a f d ,  926 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
425. See Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989). In 
Chemical Manufacturers, the plaintiffs contended that the cost of installation of equipment 
required by the EPA was wholly out of proportion to the effluent reduction and failed to meet 
the cost effectiveness test required by the Act. Id. at 178. The court refused to find that the 
costs were totally disproportionate to the benefits and relied on the fact that BPT was the 
lowest level in the progression of increasingly stringent technology-based requirements imposed 
by the Clean Water Act. Id. at 185. This was the average of the best and Congress did not 
intend that initial BPT must be "cheap." Id. at 205. In fact, Congress anticipated that BPT 
would cause plant closures and the loss of 50,000 to 125,000 jobs. Id. Congressman Harsha, 
speaking in the house in March 1972, called the attention of the Members to a private study 
that estimated the loss of these jobs because of the 1976 date of BPT. Id. Therefore, the court 
deferred to the decision of the EPA in finding that the costs were not "wholly disproportion- 
ate." Id. at 185; see also Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at  552-53 (miners failed to show that 
the provisions of Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments which limited the dis- 
charge of pollutants deprived them of economically viable use of their property as would s u p  
port their takings claim). But see Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 
161 (1990). There, the plaintiff was a large-scale miner of limestone. Id. at 164. Prior to the 
commencement of any mining activities, Congress passed amendments to the Clean Water Act 
which required a permit to conduct mining activities. Id. The plaintiff applied to the Army 
Corps of Engineers for a permit, but its application was denied on the stated ground that a 
permit would not be in the public interest. Id. The plaintiff argued that the denial effected a 
taking of property. Id. The court first rejected the Army Corps assertion of the "nuisance 
exception" to the Fifth Amendment, since rock mining of the type planned for the plaintiffs 
property had never become a nuisance. Id. at  166. The court went on to apply the three-factor 
regulatory takings test and found a taking. Id. The value of the property after the government 
action was only nominal (falling from $10,500 per acre to $500). Id. The plaintiff purchased 
the property for the sole purpose of limestone mining, and there was virtually no other business 
by which the plaintiff could "recoup its investment or better, subject to the regulation." Id. at 
175. 
426. Nolon, supra note 177. 
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nances tend to apply to a limited number of properties with histori- 
cal characteristics; 2) "arbitration," where the regulatory regime 
burdens and benefits. many properties across a broad geographical 
area and where courts give great deference to the legislature; 3) 
"public injury," where regulations are designed to prevent uses 
which threaten injury to public health and safety and where courts 
give even more deference to the legislature; and 4) "undue burden," 
where the regulations operate to deprive an owner of a fundamental 
right inhering in property, such as the right to exclude, and where 
the courts give very little deference to the legislature.427 Nolon con- 
tinues by arguing that the "operating method" and, therefore, the 
result of reviewing courts within each of these categories is 
predi~table . '~~ 
As to the mining claim and the patented claim, the provisions of 
the proposed legislation do not purport to destroy one of the essential 
rights inhering in ownership of property (i.e., the rights to possess, to 
exclude others, to use, to injure or destroy, to enjoy the fruits and 
'profits, and to transfer), such that they. do not fall into the "undue 
burden" class of cases.4as However, if the opportunity to patent is 
regarded as a separate property interest, then its withdrawal would 
fall into this class of cases since the effect of the legislation would be 
to extinguish all fundamental rights inhering in the property interest, 
and indeed the interest altogether. Those provisions of the proposed 
legislation relating to reclamation seem to fall in the "public.injury," 
as well as the "public values" category of cases. On the whole, con- 
sidering the "unique" nature of the property at issue, that it is the 
product of government largess and that the interest in regulating 
harmful mining activities fall into the "public injury" type of regula- 
tory takings cases, one should expect the courts to show great defer- 
ence to the legislature's judgment in evaluating the validity of the 
reclamation requirements of the proposed legislation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The central belief of the proposed legislation is that the nation 
will benefit from the curtailment of the privatization of public lands. 
The assumption underlying this belief is that privatization entails 
profit-maximizing use of the land, and that public ownership, in con- 
427. Id. at 25. 
428. ld .  at 29. 
429. See, e.g., Hodel v. Inring, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
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trast, means conservation and preservation for public low-impact rec- 
reational use. This premise, however, may be unfounded in the con- 
text of public lands open to mineral exploration. The existing array 
of laws and regulations already deny the mining claimant as well as 
the patentholder much power over their claim areas, limiting any 
additional benefit to the patentholder to those that are privately rec- 
reational and aesthetic. A patentholder is not free to construct a re- 
sort hotel or factory on land within his original mining claim, al- 
though he might well build a summer cottage or grow peaches. The 
latter two activities were the kind that Congress sought to foster by 
the general mining law in 1872. At that time, the law reflected then 
contemporary public values. Since then, public values concerning 
land ownership have changed. The proposed legislation, like zoning, 
environmental protection, and historic preservation laws that have 
developed over the last century, contemplates a redefinition of our 
conception of appropriate private rights in land. Thus, when re- 
sources were abundant and the population was relatively sparse, 
mining and agricultural pursuits made sense. 
Today, however, the converse is true-resources are scarce and 
the erstwhile frontier well-populated. Without any doubt, mining ac- 
tivities threaten national interests in ecology and the environment. 
Likewise, non-mining uses pose the same threat, but in ways that are 
different and perhaps more severe than mining operations. They 
cause waste and destruction of valuable resources on the surface of 
lands embraced within claims, including timber, water, forage, fish 
and wildlife. This waste, in turn, reduces recreational value. Non- 
mining uses also cause loss through increased expenditures for man- 
agement and administration. Litter, water pollution by improper 
sewage disposal, and forest fires are additional consequences of non- 
mining uses of public lands.430 The question remains, though, 
whether the existing laws and regulations are inadequate to confront 
these threats and whether the proposed legislation will only add con- 
fusion and conflict among enforcing agencies and their goals. It has 
become increasingly evident that "long-term environmental safety of 
many mining activities is a function of the site itself, and not merely 
of good or bad practices, [i.e.,] some locations cannot be mined with- 
out creating permanent environmental damage."4g1 A plan which 
430. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 61 1 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(citing H.R: REP. NO. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2474, 2478-79); Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150, 156 (E.D. Cal. 1981). 
431. CONG. REC. S2017 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Wallop quoting 
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would include the entire withdrawal of all public lands from future 
mineral exploration and the aggressive enforcement of existing rules 
to curtail and extinguish exhausted claims would best serve to re- 
claim the public domain. 
former Secretary Steward L. Udall). 
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